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ABSTRACT
Philosophers sometimes compare justification in ethics and justification in fields
whose objectivity is considered less problematic in order to defend accounts of
justification in ethics. In A a Thaoryf Jluic John Rawls proposed an account of
justification in ethics and claimed that its methods could be understood as analogous to
methods in linguistics. Some criticized the linguistic analogy as inconsistent with
claims of ethical objectivity or as incapable of capturing components of ethical
theorizing that are important to objectivity, The three papers in this thesis defend the
use of a linguistic analogy against these criticisms.
In Part One, I examine Jerry Fodor's argument that the use of linguistic intuitions as
evidence for linguistic theories shows that linguistic theories are about psychological
states, or internal representations of grammars. I argue that the use of intuitions as
evidence for a theory need not indicate that the theory is a theory about psychological
states. I poir t out that the significance of my argument for ethics is that accepting the
linguistic analogy need not commit us to the view that, since ethical intuitions are
evidence for ethical theories, ethical theories are theories about people's ethical beliefs
rather than theories about the moral properties of acts, institutions and people.
In Part Two, 1 defend the linguistic analogy against objections made by Norman
Daniels. Daniels appears to assume a position similar to Fodor's on the implications of
using linguistic intuitions as evidence for linguistic theories In addition, Daniels
argues that a linguistic analogy suggests inadequate pressure for revision of ethical
beliefs and that an analogy with natural science is a more appropriate support for
claims to objectivity in ethics I argue that my criticisms of Fodor's position apply
equally to Daniels' argument, that Daniels underestimates the revisability of beliefs on
a linguistic model and that Daniels overlooks the potential of the linguistic model to
mect some special objections to ethical objectivity which are not as easily met on a
natural scientific model.
In Part Three, I examine Bernard Williams' dismissal of the linguistic analogy
Williams assumes an interpretation of the linguistic analogy which is based upon
construing linguistic evidence as Fodor construes it I apply the argument I used in
Part One against Fodor to Wil!iams' interpretation. Williams offers an additional
objection which is separable from his particular interpretation of the linguistic model
He claims that the linguistic model suggests that ethical theory cannot provide us with
any grounds for choosing between conflicting ethical beliefs. I argue that his
objection rests upon either the claim that theories about distortion of judgment cannot
support belief in ethical theories which contradict some ethical beliefs or the claim
that objective ethical theory is impossible. I contend that Williams offea s no reason to
doubt that social scientific theories about distortion of judgment can support belief in
ethical theories that conflict with some ethical beliefs and I argue that Williams
provides insufficient argument against the possibility of objective ethical theory
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6Introduction
1. The Import of Comparing Methods of Justification
Philosophers sometimes compare methods of justification in ethics with methods of
justification in other areas of inquiry One motivation for comparing the methods of
justifying an ethical theory with the methods of justifying theories in other areas of
inquiry is to argue that similarities between the two kinds of methods provide some
reason to believe that ethical theories can have as much claim to truth as theories in
the other areas of inquiry, or at least that they can have some claim to truth. If we are
justified in believing a theory, we are justified in believing the theory to be true. If we
are justified in believing that an ethical theory is true, we are justified in believing
that there are moral facts, i.e.. that people, actions and institutions have the moral
properties that the ethical theory ascribes to them. A perhaps more common
motivation for comparing methods in ethics with methods in other areas of inquiry is
to argue that dissimilarities between the two methods provide some reason to believe
that ethical theories cannot have as much claim to truth as theories in other areas of
inquiry, or that they can have no claim to truth at all. In this case, successful
arguments would show that the methods of justification in ethics do not support the
claim that there are moral facts, since comparison with methods in other fields show
them to be deficient. An account of the methods of justifying an ethical theory might
include some or all of the following a specification of what kinds of judgments count as
evidence for an ethical theory and why they count as evidence for an ethical theory
(i.e., why we are justified in believing the evidence and what the inferential
relationship between the evidence and the theory is) as well as what inferential
relationships there are between, on the one hand, the theory and the evidence for the
theory, and on the other, theories and non-theoretical judgments in areas of inquiry
7outside ethics Comparing methods of justification then would involve comparing some
or all of these elements
in discussions of ethical objectivity, philosophers often favor comparing ethics with
physics, chemistry or astronomy rather than for example, sociology, psychology or
history One possible motivation for this is a belief that, of all areas of inquiry, we have
the most reason to believe that theories in these "natural" sciences are true
Comparison with methods in these areas is then one test for a method's contribution to
dcaims about objectivity That is, if the standards of justification in ethics compare
favorably with those in the natural sciences, then we have one good reason for
believing that there can be objective ethical theory. However, if we do not have
reason to believe that theories in sciences other than physics, chemistry or astronomy
cannot be true, and if the methods of justification of other theories do not differ from
those of the favored theories in a way that is relevant to concerns about objectivity.
then there is no reason to prefer comparisons to the natural sciences to maintain or
deny claims about ethical objectivity
John Rawls' suggested that methods in ethics bear some comparison to methods in
linguistics. Norman Daniels,2 who is sympathetic to the claim that there can be true
ethical theories, argued that this suggested an inadequate account of justification
which could not support claims about ethical objectivity. Bernard Williams, 3 argued
that linguistics at best provides a model for the justification of ethical theories when
I john Rawls. A•heor of Jlustwi (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press, 1971) pp
46-49
2 Norman Danielk. "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics",
lourn.fal Qf Philosophy 76 (1979) p. 258; "On Some Merhods of Ethics and Linguistics",
Philosonhical Studi 37(1980) pp. 21-36.
3 Bernard Williams, Ethis a.tlithE LiljA of Philosophy (Cambridge. MA.,; Harvard
University Press, 1985) pp. 94-102
8objectivity is not an issue In the three papers in this thesis I argue that a linguistic
model for methods in ethics is not as inadequate a support for claims about ethical
objectivity as Daniels' arguments and Williams' position imply This is not meant as a
claim that a natural science model is inadequate, or less adequate, however
Justification in linguistics, like justification in other sciences (including the natural
sciences) requires explanatory coherence of relevant beliefs Moreover. comparisons
with the justification of linguistic theories may in certain respects prove more helpful
to defenders of ethical objectivity than comparisons with the justification of theories
in the natural sciences In the second half of this introduction, I will summarize some
of the more important claims and arguments of the three papers bearing upon the
alleged inadequacy of the linguistic model In the remainder of this first half I will
make two preliminary points about why consideration of methods in linguistics seems
especially relevant to ethical objectivity
There are two special concerns about objectivity in ethics that arise in part from
comparisons with the natural sciences First, the sources of some important evidence
for ethics are different from those of the natural sciences in a way that that is relevant
to objectivity. According to Rawls account of methods of justification in ethics, moral
intuitions are very important evidence for ethical theories. We may begin constructing
an ethical theory as an account of pre-theoretical judgments about, for example, the
justice or rightness of hypothetical institutions or acts These judgments can be made
by people who are not moral experts. Moreover, judgments about complex properties of
hypothetical situations are not observational in the sense that they are not made on the
basis of observation nor do we purport to test them by inspection Insofar as the
judgments are not made by moral experts, they are not the product of the well-trained
judgment of those who have been explicitly taught theories that we have good reason to
believe. Important scientific evidence generally consists in observational judgments or
9theoretical judgments of those who are well-trained in reasonably well- justified
theories The justification of scientific theories themselves can give us some reason to
grant credibility to observational judgments and the theoretical judgments of those
who are well-trained in theorics we have reason to believe, since they can give us
reason to believe accounts of perception and reason to believe the scientific theories
that justify theoretical judgments On a natural scientific model, it is unclear why we
should grant credibility to other judgments According to methods of justification in
linguistics, however, linguists can grant credibility to non-observational, non-
theoretically-informed judgments - namely, the linguistic intuitions of speakers of a
language The linguistic analogy is instructive for ethics in this regard, then, since
granting credibility to moral intuitions has been dismissed as impossible without
recourse to an implausible moral sensory organ
Second. while there is much disagreement in both ethics and science, disagreement
seems to be more widespread and less amenable to resolution in ethics than in scien ce.
Agreement and disagreement are often thought to be relevant to questions about
objectivity For example, agreement might be taken to be some evidence for truth in
scientific inquiry, for the following reasons. Suppose that scientists come to agree on a
particular theory because experiments they have conducted have borne out many
observational consequences of the theory over time. The best explanation of the
scientists' observations (and thus of their agreement on the theory) may be that they
are the result of the causal relations between entities described by the theory - that is,
that the theory is true Disagreement, on the other hand, might be explained by the
claim that there are no facts of the sort that the theory purports to describe Without
the degree or agreement comparable to that found in science, we have less evidence
that there are the moral facts described by moral theories than we have that there are
scientific facts
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One source of the relative lack of consensus on moral theory is that moral theories
have consequences that are at variance with many pre-theoretical judgments Without
substantial independent reason to believe moral theories, we have less reason to accept
a theory that contradicts common moral judgments for which there may be some
minimal justification than we have to accept a scientific theory that contradicts, say,
common-sense physics. When a linguistic theory conflicts with certain pre-
theoretical judgments of speakers, the linguistic judgments may be explained as the
products of factors that interfere with linguistic competence, The justification for
disregarding some discrepent linguistic judgments made by speakers consists in
offering independently plausible psychological theories about factors that peculiarly
or especially affect linguistic judgments. So independently plausible psychological
theories about particular forms of distortion play an important role in the justification
of linguistic theories that conflict with pre-theoretical judgments of speakers, Ethical
judgments are especially prone to distortion because they are judgments that can have
a direct bearing on our self-interest, self-esteem and sense of security. This suggests
that theories about forms of distortion that peculiarly affect moral judgments should
play a large role in the justification of ethical theories and may serve conspicuously in
bringing about more agreement on ethical theories
I do not mean to suggest that methods of justification in the natural sciences preclude
granting any credibility to non-observational or non-theoretically trained judgments,
nor certainly that they preclude the use of theories about distortion. Rather I mean to
underscore the relevance of the linguistic analogy to issues of ethical justification by
highlighting parallels between these domains and by suggesting that these parallels
may provide a way to block certain common paths to ethical scepticism.
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2 Ethics and Linguistics
A plausible constraint on accounts of justification in ethics is that they be compatible
with the is/ought distinction. The is/ought distinction, as it is relevant to present
issues, may be stated as the claim that there is a distinction between moral and non-
moral statements such that no consistent set of non-moral statements entails a moral
statement If we accept the is/ought distinction, then there is at least no deductive
justification of a moral judgment completely on the basis of non-moral judgments. The
is/ought distinction suggests that we cannot justify moral judgments completely on the
basis of non-moral judgments On a plausible account of the methods of justifying a
moral theory, at least some of the beliefs offered in support of a moral theory are
themselves moral beliefs. if moral beliefs are needed to justify other moral beliefs, and
all beliefs used to justify a belief must themselves be justified, then we might conclude
that the most plausible account of justification of moral beliefs involves mutual support
between theoretical and non-theoretical moral beliefs rather than one-way support
between one moral belief and another. Otherwise, we are left with two unattractive
options. The first option is that an infinite number of justifying beliefs is needed to be
justified in believing a moral theory, since all justifying beliefs must themselves be
justified by a moral judgment which supports but is not supported by any beliefs which
have already been justified. The second option is that some moral beliefs support all
other moral beliefs and are themselves justified without the support of any other
beliefs. These options are unattractive if we do not believe that moral justification
requires that we hold an infinite number of beliefs, or that any judgments, or any
moral judgments, are self-justifying
In AThgeotv gf Jgtis. John Rawus proposed a "mutual support" account in which the
justification of principles of justice is a matter of their membership in a set of beliefs
12
with a high degree of consistency and inferential connection between the beliefs 4
Rawls claimed that "a conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident
principles or conditions on principles, instead, its justification is a matter of the mutual
support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent
view". The set of beliefs includes particular moral judgments that we have good reason
to be confident of, relevant moral and non-moral judgments and background theories
such as a theory of the person, general social theory and a theory of the role of
morality in society5), and the principles of justice themselves In developing
principles of justice that can be members of such a coherent set, we fir-l propose
principles that can match particular judgments about justice that we have reason to
believe are not distorted Rawls 6 suggested that we begin constructing a moral theory
much as a linguist develops a linguistic theory. Just as a linguist attempts to
characterize linguistic abilities of speakers by developing principles whose
consequences match the judgments of speakers about their language, Rawls proposed
that initially moral philosophy captures our moral sense when moral principles match
"everyday" moral judgments
A linguistic theory, or in particular a grammatical theory, attempts to provide the
best account of speaker judgments about grammaticality If the justification of moral
theories is parallel to the justification of linguistic theory, a moral theory attempts to
provide the best account of people's particular moral judgments. Norman Daniels7
believes that one critic of Rawls is right in claiming that the parallel to linguistics
4 Rawls, pp 19-21, 46-51,579-581
3 Daniels offers this list as the most important relevant background theories in
Daniels. "Methods", "Wide Reflective Equilibrium" as well as in his "Reflective
Equilibrium and Archimedean Points", Canadian Journal o Philosophy 10 (1980) pp 83-
103
6 Rawls, p.47.
7 Daniels, "On Some Methods" p 21
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suggests that moral theory is a form of anthropology, since it is then simply a theory
about different moral beliefs that people actually hold, R.M Hare comments on Rawls
...t is quite all right to test a linguistic theory (a
grammar) against what people actually say when
they are speaking carefully; people's linguistic
intuitions are, indeed, in the end, authoritative for
what is correct in their language The kind of
interplay between theory and data that occurs in
all sciences can occur here, and it is perfectly
proper for the data to be utterances of native
speakers. But the only 'moral' theories that can be
checked against people's actual moral judgments
are anthropological theories about what, in
general, people thiank one ought to do, not moral
principles about what one ought to do, 8
If Hare is right, the linguistic analogy seems to commit a proponent of this account of
justification to positions she may well want to avoid. On this construal, if moral
theories simply are the best accounts of people's moral beliefs in the anthropological
sense of an account of beliefs, whether or not a moral theory is true depends upon
people's moral beliefs. If we wish to hold that moral statements (in particular. moral
theories) are true or false independently of our moral beliefs, we cannot maintain that
moral theories are the best account of people's moral beliefs.
However, the linguistic model need not be taken to suggest that the truth or falsity of
a moral theory depends upon people's moral beliefs. It is true that whether or not a
linguistic theory is true does depend upon what people say. since a linguistic theory is
a theory about a natural language and natural languages are languages that people use
to communicate However, it doesn't follow from this that a linguistic theory is about
what people judge ash4 the properties of their language. People's linguistic beliefs (as
% R.M. Hare, "Rawls' Theory of Justice" in Norman Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawl.R (New
York: Basic Books, 1975) p 86
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opposed to simply what they say in communicating with one another) are beliefs about
the properties of their language. What people judge about their language may simply
be evidence for what properties their language has, and people can be mistaken in
their judgments about their language People's judgments about their native language,
in particular their judgments about the grammaticality of strings of words, may count
as evidence for a theory of grammar for the following reasons: A grammar is a set of
rules that generates the sentences of the language A string of worJs is grammatical if
it is generated by the rules, and otherwise it is not. In order to be able to speak a
language, speakers have internalized a set of rules that enables them to understand and
produce sentences of the language. Difficulty in understanding a sentence, apart from
unfamiliarity with the meanings of particular words, may be explained by the fact that
a string of words does not accord with a speaker's set of internalized rules. In these
circumstances, speakers often judge sentences they are presented with by linguists to
be ungrammatical. If a string of words does not accord with the set of rules
internalized by a speaker of the language, this is some evidence that the string of
words is not grammatical since it is implausible to suppose that a speaker could be a
speaker of the language if her internalized set of rules did not enable her to
understand a sufficient number of the sentences of the language in which she
communicates. Thus her judgment that a string is ungrammatical is some evidence that
it is un grammatical.
Hare's remarks might suggest a different worry about the linguistic analogy. If
people's linguistic intuitions are authoritative for what is correct in their language,
then this may suggest that they are unrevisable Rawls' account countenances
revision of moral judgments on the basis of coherence, so th linguistic analogy would
be inadequate It would be particularly damaging to prospects for an objective ethical
theory to bar revision of the moral judgments we confidently hold The set of
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confidently-held moral judgments is inconsistent. Moreover, it is plausible to maintain
that our con fidently-held moral judgments are very susceptiole to bias, since, for
example, moral judgments bear closely upon matters that concern our self-interest
Paper Two. some of the main points of which I will now summarize, is a critical
examination of Daniels' reaction to Hare and of Daniels' own position on the alleged
shortcomings of the linguistic analogy. Daniels concedes that the linguistic model does
leave open the possibility that a moral theory might provide grounds for the revision
of our moral judgments He notes that a linguistic theory provides grounds for the
revision of a speaker's judgment if the speaker's judgment does not reflect the
speaker's linguistic competency rather than some performance error due to factors
such as inattention or memory limitation 9 Thus we can maintain the linguistic model
and claim that a moral theory may be justified if it is inconsistent with moral
judgments that do not reflect people's moral competency, such as moral judgments that
might be distorted by self-interest However, Daniels believes that this provision for
the revisability of moral judgments does no more than suggest that a moral theory is a
description of a person's moral cownnetency and is justified just in case we have reason
to believe it correctly describes a person's moral competency 10 He claims that we
should reject this because principles that are justified simply because they correctly
describe a person's moral competency do not thereby constitute a justified moral
theory According to Daniels' interpretation of reflective equilibrium, background
theories provide a basis for choosing among competing moral conceptions, perhaps
giving a reason to believe that one conception is correct On Daniels picture, the first
step in achieving reflective equilibrium involves postulating alternative principles
that more or less match moral judgments which we have some reason to be confident
9 Daniels, "On Some Methods" pp 23-25
o10 p,2
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of A principle and set of confidently-made moral judgments which have been adjusted
for coherence are in narrow reflective equilibrium These alternative principles may
capture alternative moral conceptions or competencies. In order to be fully justified,
however, these principles are subject to a further constraint to cohere with
background moral and non-moral theories, and so to .,e part of a wide reflective
equilibrium of particular judgments, principles and background theoriec The
resulting principles do not describe an actual competency as opposed to, perhaps, the
morally correct competency
Daniels rejects the linguistics analogy in part because he believes that it
suggests that moral theories are not justified by being in wide reflective equilibrium
with background theories, but rather that they are justified by being part of a narrow
reflective equilibrium with moral judgmenhs and moral principles. Daniels appears to
believe that since linguistic theory is justified by narrow reflective equilibrium, the
linguistic analogy suggests that moral theory is part of moral psychology He shares
this view about the linguistic analogy with Bernard Williams 11 If they are right, and
if we wish to maintain that moral theory is not a part of psychology, we should reject
the linguistic model
However, in identifying justification in linguistics with narrow reflective
equilibrium, Daniels implies that background theories play no role in the justification
of linguistic theories. But at least background psychological theories as well as
linguistic judgments can figure in the justification of linguistic theories. Moreover,
even if a moral theory is justified if it is the best account of moral judgments that
reflect people's moral competency, rather than moral judgments we have reason to
11 Williams, pp. 97-98,
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believe rý,flect a distortion of that competency, we need not conclude that a moral
theory is merely a description of people's moral competency, and hence is part of
psychology. Moral theories may be justified if they are the best accounts of moral
judgments that reflect people's moral competency because moral judgments that reflect
moral competency are important or primary evidence for a moral theory. If this is so,
then Daniels' view implies that if moral judgments that reflect moral competency are
important or primary evidence for a moral thecry, then moral theory is a part of
psychology. Someone might accept this implication of Daniels' view on the basis of
interpreting the claim that justified theories must explain intuitings rather than the
claim that theories must explain what is intuited This interpretation is clearly at work
in arguments that Jerry Fodor 12 uses for his views about linguistics, and we may be
tempted to apply it to moral theory either as an implication of the linguistics analogy
or simply as the appropriate interpretation of a claim made for any area in which a
justified theory must explain intuitions Paper One is a critical discussion of Fodor's
arguments, the contents of which I will now summarize
Fodor argues that something counts as evidence for a theory only if the theory
explains the evidence and that, since speaker intuitions are the evidence for a
linguistic theory, linguistic theory must explain speaker intuitions. He claims that
explaining speaker intuitions requires invoking psychological mechanisms, and hence
linguistic theory must invoke psychological mechanisms. Thus linguistics is a part of
psychology. However, his claim that explaining speaker intuitions requires invoking
psychological mechanisms hinges on the claim that in explaining speaker intuitions,
12 Jerry Fodor, "Some Notes On What Linguistics is About", in Ned Block (ed.). in
Philosophy Qf Psychology, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press) pp. 197-
207.
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we must eplain intuitin.s rather than intuiteds That is, the theory must explain the
occurrences of intuitions rather than the content of the intuitions
Fodor argues for his view about linguistics and explaining intuition on the basis
of the general point that a theory must explain its evidence This may lead us to believe
that the correct interpretation of "intuition" is indicated by interpretationb of
analogous claims about other kinds of evidence However, the type of ambiguity in the
claim about intuitions equally affects claims about observational evidence The
implications for what can count as an appropriate explanation for a theory's
observational evidence differ if we interpret the observational evidence to be
"observings" or "observeds" - that is, as occurrences of observations, rather than the
content of the observations In general, explaining the content of a judgment is not
the same as explaining the occurrence of a judgment We might explain the content of
the judgment that someone died by referring to a cause of death, but explain the
occurrence of the judgment by referring to, for example, beliefs that a judger has
about the signs of death Perhaps it is natural to expect a full explanation of the
occurrence of the judgment that someone died to include psychological entities such as
beliefs, but there is no such expectation of the explanation of the content of the
judgment that someone died unless a cause of the death is psychological 11'f speaker
judgments or moral judgments are evidence for a theory because linguistic or moral
theories explain the facts expressed by these judgments, this in itself implies nothing
about whether or not the theories are psychological
Daniels believes that the fact that revision of speaker judgments is limited to those
deemed not reflective of a speaker's competence raises a difficulty for the model which
is separate from suggesting that moral theory is a part of psychology A justified moral
theory should provide grounds for revision of moral judgments that do reflect a
19
person's moral competence 13 Daniels discussion suggests 14 that one reason for this is
that, the wider the grounds for revisability, the more likely is the resolution of moral
disagreement. The persistence of moral disagreement has led some philosophers to
question whether there are moral facts and thus whether any moral theories can be
justified. Widespread morih disagreement makes acceptance of a moral theory
problematic when particular moral beliefs on which there is much moral disagreement
are offered as a major support for the theory. It seems plausible to claim that the more
bases there are for revising a moral judgment, the more chances there are for
reaching agreement in moral judgment Widening the grounds for revision seems to
increase our chances for revision, and perhaps our chances for agreement if there is
more agreement on the beliefs that serve as these grounds.
However, the background mar theories that are the grounds for revision may
themselves rely on moral judgments on which there is wide disagreement Theories
about what lives are most valuable might be candidates for grounds upon which we
might revise judgments about what acts are right should these juugments conflict with
these theories We then might come to agreement on judgments about what acts are
right. But if we disagree on, for example, what particular kinds of lives are valuable,
consideration of theories about valuable lives will not effect an agreement. Revision
on the basis of non-moral theories that do not concern distortion may be insufficient to
secure enough agreement to make acceptance of one theory more likely. Moral
disagreements often remain after disputants agree (if only for the sake of argument)
on what seem to be all the relevant non-moral beliefs that do not concern the distortion
of moral judgments So perhaps moral disagreement would persist in the face of
13 Daniels, "On Some Methods" p, 25.
t4 Daniels, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium", pp 256-257.
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agreement on what actually are all the relevant non-moral beliefs that do not concern
distortio n
Both Rawlst 5 and Williams16 note that people are more likely to revise a moral
belief when there is an explanation of how we came to have the erroneous belief than
when there is not. As Rawls claims:
When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing
account of his sense of justice (one, say, which embodies various
reasonable and natural presumptions), he may well revise his
judgments to conform to its principles even though the theory
does not fit his existing judgments exactly. He is especially likely
to do this if he can find an explanation for the deviation which
undermines his confidence in his original judgments and if the
conception presented yields a judgment which he finds he can
now accept.
Such explanations for deviations may take different forms. My judgment may deviate
from certain consequences of the theory because the theory is consistent with certain
other judgments, which I can see are true, and the theory could not be consistent with
both my judgment and the latter judgments. An alternative form of explanation, which
I take Rawls to be alluding to, is a claim that the judgment is distorted which draws
upon some more or less sophisticated theory of how factors such as self-interest or class
bias adversely affect our ability to make correct moral judgments. Without such
explanations and without better reason to believe a moral theory that is inconsistent
with the belief than to believe an alternative moral theory that is consistent with the
belief, it may reasonable to maintain an erroneous belief, making slight adjustments in
one's overall belief system to accommodate any inconsistencies in the entire system of
moral and non-moral beliefs. Moral disagreement between the holder of the erroneous
belief and the proponent of the theory with which it is inconsistent would persist if the
15 Rawls, p, 48.
16 Williams, p. 219, n. 16.
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former opted for such minor adjustments. It may be then that revisability on the basis
of theories about how moral judgments come to be distorted plays as important a role in
the resolution of ethical disagreement as revisability on the basis of, for example,
background moral theories, given a relative lack of consensus on correct background
moral theories. So revisability on the basis of, for example, psychological theories
about how linguistic competence can be distorted, may be more of an instructive aspect
of the linguistic model of justification than a reason to abandon it, whether or not we
believe that there is some comparably specific moral competence
in Paper Three, I examine Bernard Williams' reasons for rejecting a linguistic model
for the justification of ethical theories As I noted e^rlier, he shares Daniels'
assumption that a linguistic analogy implies that ethics is a part of psychology, and so
his position is susceptible to some of the same criticisms that Daniels' view is Apart
from this, Williams17 claims that ethics should be distinguished from linguistics
because we need to have a reason t( accept an ethical theory with consequences that
conflict with our non-theoretical ethical beliefs. But the linguistic model for
justification of theory does provide a reason to accept a theory with consequences that
conflict with our non-theoretical beliefs For example, as I mentioned in the earlier
discussion of Daniels, the linguistics model for justification of theory provides for the
revision of linguistic judgments on the grounds that the judgments are a product of the
distortion of linguistic competence. This suggests a reason for accepting a theory with
consequences that conflict with pre-theoretical beliefs, namely, that the pre-
theoretical beliefs with which the theory conflicts are distorted, and the theory
provides a relatively comprehensive explanation of our other beliefs. Of course, these
considerations will not count as reasons for accepting an ethical theory if we have
17 Williams, pp. 98-99
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some reason to believe that ethical theories cannot be true. If ethical theories cannot
be true. ethics should be distinguished from linguistics and the linguistic model for
justification is inapplicable to ethics
The linguistic model for justification of moral theory need not be taken to suggest
that moral theory i. a part of anthropology or psychology and so should not be rejected
on that basis, if at all. I take the model to suggest that justification of a theory is
possible when important evidence for it consists of more or less sophisticated pre-
theoretical judgments on which there may be much disagreement. If we can have some
reason to believe our pre-theoretical judgments independently of the theory, and we
have some independently plausible accounts of how these judgments can come to be
distorted, we can have reason to believe a theory that accounts for these judgments and
is consistent with explanations for distortion of judgments the theory rejects.
Linguistic theories are theories about natural languages Natural languages are
languages that people use or have used. It is implausible to suppose that we could be
very mistaken about what sentences are or are not a part of our language and still
manage to speak the language. Thus, our judgments about our language can serve as
evidence for th. linguist. Nevertheless, we can be mistaken in virtue of memory or
other psychological limitations which it is independently plausible to suppose we are
subject to, and which may affect our linguistic judgments in specific ways. Criticisms
of the linguistic model should address the question of whether or not there is any
reason to believe particular moral judgments which is independent of particular moral
theories and whether any theories about the distortion of moral judgments could
provide independent support for a moral theory by giving reason to believe that the
pre-theoretical moral judgments it contradicts are distorted.
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It may be plausible to believe, for example, that moral judgments made in accordance
with particularly widespread and long-lasting moral norms contain a sufficient
number of truths to serve as some evidence for moral theories, Moral norms give
certain criteria for behavior which reflect equal consideration for everyone affected
by the behavior, Behaviors that result iin significant inequities in the distribution of
social resources do not in general meet criteria that reflect equal consideration for
everyone affected by the behavior. Inequities in the distribution of social resources
are likely to result in social instability, given conditions that do not severely impair the
capacity of those who suffer from the inequities to act on their own behalf. Some
moral norms, then, are criteria for behaviors that help to maintain social stability and
it is plausible to believe that we should develop an ability to recognize such criteria
over time with some accuracy. Moral judgments may be far less reliable and far more
prone to distortion than linguistic judgments. Moral judgments, for example, concern
matters that directly affect our self-interest, sense of self-esteem and sense of security
since they concern distribution of social goods and forms of social cooperation. Our
tendency toward bias in these. matters may be far greater than our tendency toward
bias in matters not so directly related to self-interest, self-esteem and sense of security
This need not lead us to the view that there are no moral facts about which there is
much disagreement, if we can explain the greater unreliability of and disagreement in
judgments as traceable to distortions to which moral judgments are particularly highly
prone. But even if moral judgments are far less reliable than linguistic judgments and
far more prone to distortion, the linguistic model need not prove unilluminating. The
arguments I examine from Daniels, Fodor and Williams do not provide good reasons for
rejecting the help that a linguistic analogy can offer to moral epistemology,
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Paper One: Comments on Fodor's "On What Linguistics Is About".
Introduction
Jerry Fodorl argues that general considerations about what constitutes good
scientific methodology count against both the position that we could specify a priori
that linguistic intuitions constitute the data that a true linguistic theory accounts for
and the position that linguistic theories or grammars need not themselves refer to
psychological states. He thinks that to assume that a priori specification of linguistic
data is possible and that grammars need not be internally represented neglects two
important considerations. First. it is unreasonable to be certain that data previously
assumed irrelevant will never prove to be relevant as a result of scientific
investigation. Second, a reasonable constraint on scientific theories is that they be
able to explain why what is taken to be evidence for a theory is evidence for a theory.
Fodor argues that linguistic theories that do not make reference to the psychological
states of speakers are ruled out by the requirement that a theory be able to explain why
its evidence counts as evidence.
I argue that the general considerations about good scientific methodology Fodor cites
do not rule out a priori specification of linguistic data or linguistic theories that do not
themselves refer to psychological states on two grounds. First, whatever plausibility a
priori specification of linguistic data has or lacks, specifiying a priori some but not all
data leaves room for finding more data relevant as inquiry proceeds. Second, there are
two different interpretations of what the data that linguistic intuitions provide are and
on only one of them does the requirement seem to necessitate reference to
I Jerry A. Fodor, "Some Notes on What Linguistics is About", in Ned Block, ed., Readin ias
in Philosophy of Psychology 2 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp.
197-207. All page references to this essay will be given parenthetically in the text.
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psychological states. We can take the data to be psychological itself (that is, as
occurrences of intuitions, or intuitipag). and so to require reference to psychological
states, or we can take the data to be merely psychological in origin (that is, as the
content of linguistic intuitions, or intuitgs.), and so not to require reference to
psychological states. Many scientific theories with data that are merely psychological
in origin, for example, astronomical theories with obser.'ational data, do not provide
explanations that make reference to psychological states. We may be reluctant to adopt
the latter interpretation because of general epistemological concerns about the
reliability of intuition, in which case it is not necessarily canons of good scientific
methodology, but a certain epistemological position, that allegedly necessitates
reference to psychological states. Finally, I argue that some intuitions about good
scientific practice may lead us to adopt a position about specification of data which is
closer to the a priori view than Fodor's own view is.
My interest in Fodor's arguments stems from the consideration that if certain
constraints on theories automatically follow from taking intuitions as evidence for
theories, this might have a bearing on how we assess the proposal that justification of
ethical theories parallels the justification of linguistic theories, since the parallel
suggests that ethical intuitions provide some of the evidence for ethical theories.
Barring a special dispensation for ethics, accepting Fodor's arguments seems to commit
us to the view that ethical principles must refer to the psychological states of people
who make ethical judgments and to suggest that we cannot claim that ethical intuitions
are evidence for ethical theories in advance of the development of ethical theories that
can explain ethical intuitings. Ethical theorists may well wish to avoid both of these
positions. First, if the claim that ethical principles must refer to the psychological
states of people who make ethical judgments implies that the truth of ethical statements
depends upon our ethical beliefs, then we might conclude that ethical theories lack
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objectivity. Moreover, the claim conflicts with a more common-sense view that many
ethical principles are about the ethical value of acts and institutions and do not refer to
psychological states. Second, even if ethical theories are either insufficiently
developed now to explain ethical intuitings, or never in fact will explain ethical
intuitings, we might hold that there is good reason to believe that wide reflective
equilibrium, which counts ethical intuitions as evidence for ethical theories, is the
correct account of justification in ethics. If the general constraints on theories do not
have the consequences for linguistics that Fodor claims, however, analogies between
linguistics and ethics are not threatened by the prospect of commitment to these
positions on the basis of Fodor's arguments.
The particular analogy between ethics and linguistics aside, one of Fodor's arguments
bears some resemblence to how Bernard Williams 2 uses what has been called the
"explanatory requirement"3 in an argument against the possibility of objective ethical
theories. Fodor uses the requirement that theories must explain why what they take to
be evidence for a theory is evidence for a theory to argue against the position that
linguistic theories need not be themselves psychological in the sense that c.:rrect
grammars that linguists develop are not necessarily internally represented. Williams
offers the following as one argument for why objective theories are possible in science
but not in ethics: The possibility of objective theories in science rests upon the in
principle possibility that a suitably abstract and general scientific theory could be used
to explain how people came to have certain beliefs, including belief of the theory itself.
Normative ethical theories, however, cannot themselves explain why people do or do
2 Bernard Williams, ahia and lb Limits of Philosophyb (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1985), pp. 132-155.
3 See Warren Ouinn, "Truth and Explanation in Ethics", lhi96 (1986), pp. 524-44 The
original articulation of the requirement for ethics is in Gilbert Harman, The Nal[ur .t
Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 3-23.
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not have any ethical beliefs. They at best divide these judgments into those that are
correct and those that are incorrect. If they did try to explain the occurrence of the
judgments, they could count as objective theories, but they would be merely
psychological theories of how we came to have certain judgments, and not theories
about what our ethical judgments ought to be
In the following qections, I first present a statement of two opposing positions on
specifying data for a linguistic theory. I believe that this statement of the two
opposing positions clearly mark an important distinction between two general views
on the subject matter of linguistics that Jerry Fodor describes in "Some Notes on What
Linguistics is About" Nt•t, I consider the a&'•uments Fodor offers for his view and
some replies to these. In the final section, I offer an argument for a middle position on
specifying linguistic data.
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1. Two Positions on Linguistic Data
Fodor claims that philosophically interesting answers to the question of what it is for
a linguistic theory to be true are answers to the question "What facts are such that the
truth of a linguistic theory consists in its correspondence to thjQ facts?" (p. 197). T ro
conflicting meta- theoretical views constrain the possible answers to this question. As
Fodor describes them, according to one view "the questicn is susceptible to a priori
settlement, in fact...we can even now specify a priori some set of facts such that the
truth of a linguistic theory consists in its correspondence to them"; according to the
other, "the question of what facts a true linguistic theory corresponds to is answerable
only a posteriori, in fact only after adequate linguistic theories have been developed"
(pp. 197-198). He calls the school of thought associated with the former view "the
forces of darkness" and the school of thought adhering to :he latter "the forces of
light". Later I will argue that there is something to be sasd for the forces of darkness,
though not necessarily the same things that are said by those who Fodor alleges
currently ally with these forces.
Given these two methodological views, two possible opposing positions emerge: (a) we
can specify a priori that intuitions are or are not the facts that a true linguistic theory
accounts for, and (b) the development of linguistic theory tends to point to the
conclusion that intuitions are or are not the facts to which a true linguistic theory
corresponds
One interpretation of what Fodor means by "the facts that a true linguistic theory
corresponds to" threaten to place the dispute between the two schools of thought
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btyond any serious interest. Suppose that the linguistic theory can be stated as a single
(perhaps conjunctive) proposition; then surely among the facts that a true linguistic
theory corresponds to is the one expressed by that proposition, and a dispute about
whether or not we could settle a priori the question of whether what is expressed by a
true linguistic theory is or is not one of the facts a true linguistic theory accounts for
does not seem to be an issue in which Fodor is interested. Another way of expressing
what Fodor might mean by "the facts that a true linguistic theory corresponds to" is
"the data that a true linguistic theory accounts for". This expression both eliminates
obviously unintended readings with consequences like the one above and seems to be
in line with Fodor's intentions as they are revealed in the rest of the essay. Aside from
his specific intent to argue for his own view on what linguistics is about, in this essay
Fodor seems to be arguing that controversies about the subject matter of linguistics are
related to positions on what counts as evidence for a linguistic theory, so that
constraints on what can count as evidence constrain subject matter Thus a better
description of the particular competing views of the opposing forces in which we are
interested is, first, the position that we can specify a priori that intuitions are or are
not the data that a true linguistic theory accounts for and, second, the position that the
development of linguistic theories tends to point to the conclusion that intuitions are or
are not the data that a true linguistic theory accounts for.
A further modification of the positions as stated will enable us to sidestep objections
stemming from certain intermediary positions that differ from the two already stated
positions in ways that ultimately prove insignificant for the purposes of this
discussion A proponent of one of the intermediate positions I have in mind denies that
we can specify a priori that intuitions are aj of the data that a true linguistic theory
accounts for but may nevertheless believe that we can specify a priori that intuitions
constitute mat of the data that a true linguistic theory accounts for. To accommodate
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both the intermediary and the "extreme" positions we can describe the views under
consideration as the following:
(1) We cannot specify a priori that intuitions constitute (or do
not constitue) at least some of the data that a true linguistic
theory accounts for.
(2) We can specify a priori that intuitions constitute (or do not
constitute) at least some of the data that a true linguistic
theory accounts for.
Though Fodor characterizes the positions in terms of the ability to specify a priori
what the evidence for linguistic theories is, Isuggest that ultimately what is most
important for Fodor is whether or not we can specify in advance of the development of
linguistic theories that intuitions constitute evidence for linguistic theories. In what
follows, I will use the phrases "specify a priori" and "specify in advance of the
development of the theory" interchangeably.
The foregoing is not an idle mapping out of four possible positions on the role of
intuitions in linguistic theories. At least two of these positions are actually held by
philosophers. Fodor himself maintains that the development of linguistic theories
lends support to the view that intuitions constitute some of the data that a linguistic
theory may account for (and this could not have been specified a priori), while
Stephen Stich 4 and Jerrold Katz 3 hold the view that intuitions are at least some of the
data that a linguistic theory accounts for and we can specify this independently of any
developments in linguistic theory.
4 Stephen P. Stich, "Grammar, Psychology and Indeterminacy", in Block op. cit., pp.
208-222.
5 Jerrold Katz, "The Real Status of Semantic Representations", in Block, op. cit., pp. 253-
275; Lnuaes an Ohi r A&bstract U Qbikns (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981).
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I take positions (1) and (2) to be specific statements expressing meta-theoretical
views of the schools of thought that Fodor labels, respectively, the forces of light and
the forces of darkness. Fodor claims that the choice between the two positions espoused
by these schools will "determine views on most of the rest the methodological issues in
the field". He then elaborates on what he takes to be common to the views of the
adherents to each school, calling the positions "the Right View" and "the Wrong View".
It is worthwhile here to make an initial examination of these views and their relations
to positions (1) and (2).
According to Fodor, those who adhere to the Wrong View believe that: (a)there is a
specifiable data base for linguistic theories; (b) that this data base can be specified
antecedent to theory construction; (c) that the empirical content of linguistic theories
consists of what they say about the data base; and (d) that the data base for linguistics
consists of the intuitions about grammaticality, ambiguity, etc., that informants do or
would produce, given specified forms of prompting. Those who adhere to the Right
View claim that (a) Linguistic theories are descriptions of grammars. (b)It is
nomologically necessary that learning one's native language involves learning its
grammar, so a theory of how grammars are learned is de facto a theory of how
languages are learned. (c) It is nomologically necessary that the grammar of a
language is internally represented by speaker/hearers of that language. (d) It is
nomologically necessary that the internal representation of the grammar is causally
implicated in communication exchanges between speakers and hearers insofar as these
exchanges are mediated by their use of the language they share; talking and
understanding the language normally involve exploiting the internally represented
grammar (pp. 198-199)
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Fodor points out that a salient difference between the two views on the nature of
what the data for a linguistic theory can be is attributable to the fact that, according to
the Right View, linguistics is embedded in psychology and hence any data could in
principle be relevant to the choice between competing ethical theories. Anything
could bear upon the psychology of speaker/hearers of a language. The Wrong View, on
the other hand, makes no claims about the relation of linguistics and psychology and
limits the data base to speaker intuitions. If Fodor is right about the relationship
between the opposing meta-theoretical views and the "rest of the methodological issues
in the field", if you adhere to the Right View (henceforth known as View A) you adhere
to Position (1), and if you adhere to the Wrong View (henceforth known as View B), you
adhere to Position (2).
In the following sections. I argue that the considerations Fodor advances in favor of
the View A (and by implication Position (1)) are insufficient to establish the view, but
can be used in support of a third position which is also supported by considerations
which I believe may motivate Position (2)
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2a. Some Considerations for View A
An important component of Fodor's defense of View A rests upon some
uncontroversial observations about scientific methodology and practice. As theories
are developed, typically we discover that facts which at first seemed totally irrelevant
to the confirmation of theories are in fact relevant, and we could not have known that
such facts were relevant before the theory was so developed. Moreover, some of the
facts may be ones which we expected to be relevant only to areas of inquiry unrelated
to the theory in question, but further scientific progress may enable us to discover
relationships between what was taken to be data for one theory and what was taken to
be data for another such that both sets of data are relevant to the confirmation of
either theory.
These observations seem to weigh heavily against the view that the "data base" of a
theory can be delimited antecedent to the construction of any theory, and hence
against View B. However, it need not be crucial to View B to exclude the possiblity that
some facts might prove relevant to linguistic theories as they are developed which
were not believed to be relevant before. Some intuitions may prove to constitute
exceptions to hypothesized grammatical rules, and an investigation into these
exceptions may lead to evidence that they should not be accepted as reliable
grammatical intuitions, which would constitute (non-intuitive) evidence that the rules
are not so complex as to accomodate these irregularities. Facts about as wide a range of
phenomena as memory limitations, cultural taboos and class aspirations could bear
upon whether or not correct grammatical rules accomodate certain judgments about
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grammaticality, synonymy or ambiguity. In fact, Stephen Stich,6 who Fodor regards as
a proponent of View B. explicitly denies that speaker intuitions are the only data a
linguist needs to attend to in constructing a grammar. He allows liberal use of actual
unreflective speech, stress patterns, facts about how sentences are heard and data on
short-term verbal recall. It is for this reason that I described Position (2) as covering
both the possibility that all data for a linguistic theory is specifiable a priori and the
possibility that only some data for a linguistic theory is specifiable a priori, If a
proponent of Position (2) believed that we could know in advance of the developement
of linguistic theory that intuitions provide some but not all of the data for the theory,
he or she could consistently believe that some other evidence for the theory can come
to light.
But Fodor goes on to make another claim which may appear to cast doubt upon all
versions of View B, whatever form of Position (2) is accepted. He claims that any
science is under the obligation to explain "why what it takes to be data relevant to the
confirmation of its theories aae data relevant to the confirmation of its theories"(p.
200). Fodor goes on to claim that a typical way of meeting the obligation is "by
exhibiting a causal chain that runs from the entities the theory posits, via the
instruments of observation, to the psychological states of the observers." (p. 200).
Since any science is supposed to be under this obligation, then in particular linguistics
is, so a point which is relevant to this dispute emerges: "An adequate linguistics should
explain why it is that the intuitions of speaker-hearers constitute data relevant to the
confirmation of grammars". (p. 200). If it can be shown that an adherent of one of the
views can meet this obligation while an adherent of the other cannot, we then have an
argument for the former view. Fodor believes that this can be shown. View A meets
6 Stich, pp. 210-212.
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the obligation by saying "We can use intuitions to confirm grammars because
grammars are internally represented and actually contribute to the etiology of the
speaker/hearers intuitive judgment", whereas View B only says "We do it because we
have always done it" or "We do it by stipulation"
Fodor may have some justification for believing that the proponents of View B whom
he has in mind do or would answer the question of why intuitions should be used to
confirm grammars in the manner he claims they would. It isn't obvious that a
proponent of View B must answer the question in this way, but it is instructive to see
how the requirement that a science explain why what it takes to be data relevant to the
confirmation of its theories are data relevant to the confirmation of its theories may
appear to conflict with View B. Fodor offers an example of how the requirement might
be met in astronomy:
...So, the astronomer can argue, if there are such things as
planets, and if they are at least roughly the sorts of things
that his theories suppose them to be, then given the way
terrestrial astronomers are situated, and given the way
telescopes work, telescopic observations shouIl bear upon
the confirmation of theories about how planets are
arranged in space. (p. 200).
In keeping with others who espouse a naturalistic epistemology. Fodor suggests that
a science must provide causal explanations for its evidence which rely upon the
assumption that currently accepted, relevant views are roughly right View B makes
no claim that the entities invoked by linguistic theories causally influence speaker
intuitions, whereas View A does. View B then may seem to at best leave it open that
linguistic theories can explain why what is taken to be evidence for the theories is
evidence for the theories, whereas View A does not.
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2b. Response to Fodor's Arguments
Fodor's use of th, example of the astronomer illuminates an important conflict
between the two views. Generalizing from his concern with linguistics and his use of
astronomy as an examrle, we can infer that Fodor thinks that a science is under the
obligation to explain why what it takes to be data for its theories are data for its
theories. An immediate o )jection to this view is that the only appropriate burden for
science relevant to Fodor's point is that a science provide an explanation for its data,
not an explanation for why what the science takes to be data for its theories are data for
its theories, and while this explanation requires reference to psychological states,
there is no reference to psychological states in astronomical theories themselves.
Thus, we should not conclude that linguistic theories themselves require reference to
psychological states. Sciences themselves need not provide a theory of confirmation.
Both views would presumably agree that a science has the former burden, but
disagree on how it should be interpreted, If a science meets the obligation by
exhibiting a causal chain connecting the e atities its theories posit to the psychological
states of the observer, it is concerned wilt observations as its data in a special sense.
That is, if I take a certain set of observations as the data I have to explain, I may take it
to be my task either to explain the fact that these observations were made, in which
case I must explain the observig , or merely to explain a set of facts which happen to
be gleaned by observation, in which case I must explain the observeS47 Accordingly,
I must explain either, for example, the fact that a given scientist observed a trail in a
7 The distinction between the source and content of data is made in Katz, "Real Status",
p. 258, and is applied by William Lycan to the case of ethics in his luduement aod
lustification. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp 207 - 213.
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cloud chamber or the fact that there was a trail in a cloud chamber. These two tasks are
not mutually exclusive, but it seems that if either task needs to make use of
psychological states, only the former task needs to make use of psychological states in
its explanation (unless the data are psychological as opposed to, for example, chemical).
Fodor need not be taken to be denying that the latter interpretation exists, but his
comments suggest that he believes that the former interpretation of the task is the only
appropriate one. On this view, a science must explain the fact that we make an
observation of a certain kind at all rather than the fact which has been gleaned by
observation. I point this out because I do not think that the view is obviously correct
and Fodor does not argue for it in this essay. A natural alternative view is that it is in
the domain of epistemology or psychology to explain the relationship (causal or
otherwise) between the observation of a trail in a cloud chamber and the fact that
there is a trail in a cloud chamber, and chemistry need only concern itself with
explainjag the existence of the trail in the cloud chamber. The view would interpret
the task of such a science to explain a set of facts which happen to be gleaned by
observation rather than to explain observations in a way that necessitates an account
of psychological states of observers.
A proponent of the alternative view might then hold that the analogous task for a
linguistic theory would be to explain a set of facts (about grammaticality, synonymy,
ambiguity, etc.) which happen to be known by intuition rather than to explain the
existence of certain intuitions. The latter task, if understood to be the task of giving a
complete causal explanation, presumably would require reference to psychological
states if they causally contribute to the intuitions, whereas it is at least not obvious
what the former task requires. If the latter task is indeed one of the tasks for
linguistics, then View B fails to take account of this fact since it holds that linguistic
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theory need not invoke psychological states in its explanations. No such failure is
apparent if the task for linguistics is the former, not the latter.
It may seem that this alleged failure of View B is not really a failure. We might grant
that, in addition to simply offering explanations of certain data, it is a legitimate task
for linguists, in defense of their theories, to explain the existence of linguistic
intuitions and indeed, intuitions being what we suppose them to be, this explanation
will require reference to psychological states. However, to say that this explanation
will require reference to psychological states is not the same thing as to say that
linguistic theories themselves must invoke psychological states or entities that can
causally influence psychological states. The example of the astronomer cited by Fodor
illustrates this point. We might grant that it is a legitimate task for astronomers, in
defense of their theories, to explain the existence of observations that can count as data
for theories in astronomy, and this explanation requires reference to psychological
states and so we should not conclude that linguistic theories themselves require
reference to psychological states.
A natural retort to this objection is that it ignores a dissimilarity between astronomy
and linguistics which is significant for the purposes of this argument. If linguistic
theories themselves do not invoke psychological states, then it is difficult to see how
linguists, in defending their methodology, could produce a causal chain which would
link entities invoked by linguistic theories with psychological states of intuiters in the
service of an explanation of the existence of intuitions that can constitute data for
linguistic theories. In order to fulfill the task that Fodor believes any science must
fulfill, the entities invoked by that science's theories must be the kinds of things that
can causally influence psychological states, if the data for the theories is at least partly
psychological in origin. Consistent with fulfilling the task for astronomy, theories in
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astronomy need only invoke physical objects which could (in however roundabout a
manner) causally influence the perceptions, and hence psychological states, of
observers. The task for linguistics is more problematic, however, in a way that is
similar to difficulties in accounting for how we might have epistemological access to
abstract objects invoked in mathematical theories. Grammatical theories do not, at least
at this stage, invoke physical objects, and even if they did, it is difficult to imagine what
kind of causal influence physical objects could have upon many intuitions of
grammaticality that speakers have. The most likely candidates for causal influences
upon intuitions are psychological themselves. This is not to say that there are no other
possible kinds of causal chain ending in intuitions and beginning with entities
invoked by linguistic theories, but it appears that the burden to come up with such a
causal chain is on anyone denying that reference to psychological states is needed to
perform Fodor's task View B in effect denies that there is any such burden by stating
that intuitions constitute some of the data that a linguistic theory must account for,
whether or not linguists can produce any causal chain linking the entities to speaker
intuitions,
If there is a task for all sciences which is to be interpreted as Fodor apparently
interprets it, there is a constraint on theories to be theories whose entities are of a kind
that can causally influence psychological states when data for those theories is
psychological in origin. View B does not recognize this as a constraint on linguistic
theories. The alternative interpretation of the task offered above does not appear to
conflict with View B. however. If the linguists task is simply to explain a set of facts
about grammaticality, synonymity, ambiguity, etc., then no requirement that the
entities invoked be ones that can causally influence psychological states is obvious. I
take it that the claim that intuitions about synonymy are psychological in some
relevant sense is uncontroversial at least among proponents of both views. However,
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the claim that synonymy itself is psychological is controversial. Moreover, this task
can be fulfilled simply by explaining the linguistic theories and showing how the data
are consequences of the theories.
For exampie, Katz makes a proposal for what would count as a non-causal, non-
psychological explanation of the fact that "flammable" and "inflammable" are
synonyms:
...The explanation is, roughly, that the "in" in
"inflammable" is not a negative prefix, as it first seems,
because "inflammable" is derived from the verb "inflame"
and that "flammable" is derived from the noun "flame" by
addition of the adjective forming suffix "able". The full
explanation requires an account of the derivations of
these adjectives that exhibits the syntactic conditions
determining their synonymy and an account of the
structural reasons why the adjectives are apparently but
not really antonymous forms.8
I have argued that this alternative interpretation of the task for linguistics partly on
the basis of the plausibility of analogous interpretations of the task for other sciences.
I suspect, however, that many who find the latter plausible will not find the alternative
interpretation plausible for linguistics. The alternative interpretation of the task for
astronomy is that the task is to explain a set of facts which happen to be gleaned by
observations rather than to explain the existence of certain observations. This
presumes that there is a set of facts that happen to be gleaned by observation. But
claiming that the former, "lesser" task is perfectly respectable science seems to rest
upon having epistemological faith in observations which we may be less inclined to
have in intuitions. If we seriously doubted that we could know any facts by
observations, we would not simply take it for granted that observations provide us with
S Katz, Lanuae th Abstract Obects. p. 65.
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data for which theories must give an explanation. However, while there may be serious
doubts about the reliability of intuitions in general, where they are understood simply
as spontaneous, largely non-observational judgments, intuitions that are specifically
linguistic are not as suspect, and the degree of agreement we find in linguistic
intuitions and the reasonable prospects of being able to explain d&sagreements tends to
support confidence in them Some other sorts of intuitions, such as hunches, are often
soon contravened by other judgments we have reason to believe and this is far less
frequent for linguistic intuitions. Moreover, if speakers could not to a reasonable
extent accurately judge what sentences are in their language and some of the
relationships between sentences, they could not manage to communicate in the
language.
3, A Middle Position
There are some considerations in favor of the position that the question"What are
some of the facts that a true linguistic theory must account for ?" is answerable in
advance of the development of what Fodor would consider to be adequate linguistic
theories. We may have good reason to believe that certain beliefs constitute data for a
linguistic theory in the absence of a full causal explanation for the occurrences of
these beliefs, or the intuitings.
Fodor claims that some support for View A, and by implication Position (1), comes from
intuitions about the way that scientific practice should proceed:
it is...a consequence of the Right View that there is no a
priori distinction between linguistic data and
psychological data (or indeed, linguistic data and data of
any other kind). Such distinctions as we are able to draw
are a posteriori; we find out more and more about which
are the relevant data as we find out more and more about
how grammars function in the mental processes of
speaker/hearers. This seems to me precisely as it ought to
be; it accords with our intuitions about how scientific
practice ought to proceed. Suppose that, tomorrow, some
very clever astro-linguist were to devise an argument
that runs from observations of the Martian planet to some
other constraint on theories on human psychology and
thence to the proper formulation of the English
pseudocleft. Surely we would say "Bravo, and, well done"
not "Ingenious but not pertinent," (p. 199).
I believe that likewise some support for the position that we can make reasonable
claims about the data for a theory antecedent to the construction of theory comes from
intuitions about scientific practice. We can begin constructing a theory as an
explanation for what we pre-theoretically take to be facts within the domain of the
43
field of inquiry of which the theory is a part. Whatever causal story a linguistic theory
gives or fails to give, it seems that we can enumerate some constraints on the theory.
Any linguistic theory must explain (given modest aspirations) at least some subset of
what we pre-theoretically take to be linguistic facts, or a proponent of the theory has
the burden of explaining why what were taken to be linguistic facts are not linguistic
facts. There is no comparable burden upon any proponent of a linguistic theory to
explain why its consequences do not correspond to planetary movements, unless some
theory is available which makes convincing connections between linguistic facts and
planetary movements. This position can be maintained independently of what we pre-
theoretically take to be linguistic facts, for example, whether we believe the facts are
intuiteds, ie , intuited facts of grammaticality, ambiguity, etc., and the theory must
account for them. or that the facts that we pre-theoretically consider to be linguistic
facts are intuitings. the facts that speakers have certain intuitions about
grammaticality, ambiguity, etc. (which, incidently is the view held by Stephen Stich,9
a proponent of Position 2)
Moreover, beyond general intuitions about scientific practice, we bave some
reason to believe that, in advance of significant development of linguistic theory, we
can specify that linguistic intuiteds constitute some of the facts for which linguistic
theories give explanations. Linguistic theories are theories of natural languages, and a
natural language is used by speakers of the language The judgments of speakers about
what they say can constitute some data for linguistic theories which explain the
properties of the language if being a speaker of a language enables us to make reliable
judgments about our language Speakers have linguistic beliefs about, for example,
whether a sequence of words is grammatical in their language In advance of any
Stich,op cit
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detailed account of how speakers manage to make these judgments,( and in particular,
without Fodor's claim that they have an internal representation of grammatical rules).
we have reason to believe that at least some intuitions of speakers about the
grammaticality of sentences in their language are reasonably reliable. Grammaticality
depends upon, among other things, structural features of sequences of words (for
example, word order) which bear upon the meaning of sentences. Since structural
features bear upon meaning, they affect a speaker's comprehension of sentences.
Speaker judgments about grammaticality and ungrammaticality may be made on the
basis of comprehensibility, and insofar as speakers are reliable judgers about whether
or not they comprehend sentences (evidence for which may be their success in
communication over time), and comprehension is in fact related to structural features,
speakers can be reasonably reliable about grammaticality 10
10 An account of how native speakers manage to make these judgments would plausibly
invoke a speaker's specifically linguistic competence, since this is implicated in
comprehension. A speaker's linguistic competence includes some component which is
responsible for enabling the speaker to acquire the language. Within roughly the past
ten years, Chomsky and other linguists have developed theories of universal grammar
which some propose to be innate structures responsible for language acquisition. The
theory contains very general principles constraining possible rules of grammar for a
natural language. In addition to these principles, there are sets of values determining
how a grammar may vary with respect to each principle. For example, a principle of
all rules governing the deep (phrase) structure of a sentence in any natural language
is that all phrases contain a "head" such that certain properties of the head are
properties of the phrase. Thus, a noun phrase must contain a noun as head, and if the
noun is plural, the noun phrase is a plural noun phrase. All natural languages, and
hence grammars of natural languages, obey this contraint, but may vary according to
the possible position of the head. Some languages are "head-first" while others are
"head-last". It is hypothesized that in learning a language, rather than constructing a
complex set of rules on the basis of meager data (as was suggested earlier by attention
to versions of grammar that emphasized complex rule systems), a child selects a type of
language from among the different values available It is reasonable to suppose that
selection of a language on the basis of minimal data is a more easily and quickly
accomplished task than construction of complex rules on the basis of minimal data, and
correction for mistakes in acquisition is more easily and quickly accomplished by
simply switching to another value than by completely reconstructing a set of complex
rules. The type of language selected conforms to the general principles that are part of
the child's innate endowment.
(cont. )
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If it is not a consequence of a grammatical theory of English that "For John to will
play the piano bothers me" is ungrammatical, this counts as a very strong
consideration against it. Whether we construe the facts as intuited facts or facts about
speaker intuitions, it is incumbent upon a proponent of any linguistic theory to
explain why its consequences are at variance with speaker intutions (when they are)
or does not predict speaker intuitions (when it does not), whereas it is not incumbent
upon any proponent of a linguistic theory to explain why its consequences do not
correspond to planetary movements unless some theory is available which makes
convincing connections between the two kinds of facts. Though we may not be tempted
to believe that we can specify a priori that intuitions constitute some of the data that a
true linguistic theory accounts for, a slightly different position which Fodor appears to
reject and which is consistent with certain components of the Wrong View seems to be
quite reasonable. In advance of the development of linguistic theories to the point that
we can give a full causal account of speaker intuitings, we have some reason to believe
that either a linguistic theory must count speaker intuiteds among its consequences or
a proponent of the theory must give an explanation for why it does not.
If there is an internal representation of grammar, it may be far different from
anything Fodor imagined at the time he wrote this article. However, this need not
affect the claim that the content of linguistic intuitions can serve as data for linguistic
theory.
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Paper Two: Daniels on Reflective Equilibrium in Ethics and
Linguistics
Introduction
In ATheo of Justice John Rawls t proposed a method for arriving at a justified
moral theory which he called the method of "reflective equilibrium" The method
involves the mutual adjustment of moral judgments, moral principles and non-moral
beliefs in order to achieve a coherent set of beliefs, At a few points in his account of
this method, he compared the development of a moral theory with the development of a
linguistic theory. 2 R. M. Hare3 andThomas Nagel 4 objected to this analogy, claiming
that it suggested that we give too much authority to the common moral judgments
people actually make They argued that moral theory is not as beholden to common
moral judgments as linguistic theories are to the judgments that speakers make about
what is grammatical in their languages. Norman Daniels) basically concurred with
the criticism of the analogy between ethics and linguistics, but defended the method of
reflective equilibrium, suggesting that an analogy between the method proposed by
Rawls for ethics and methods in the natural sciences is more apt. An important
motivation for Daniels in invoking the scientific analogy and dismissing the linguistic
analogy is to strengthen the claim that reflective equilibrium in ethics is a plausible
I John Rawls, ATheorb 1V Jisti (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1971)
pp. 19-21, 46-51, 579-81
Z Rawls, pp. 46-9.
3 R.M. Hare. "Rswls' Theory of Justice" in Norman Daniels. (od.). Readini Rawlsk (New
York: Basic Books, 1975) p. 46.
r Thomas Nagel "Rawls on Justice" in Daniels, op. cit., p.2, n.2.
5 Norman Daniels, "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics".
hJ. ournal kiLhu h.shY 76 (1979) pp. 256-282; "On Some Methods of Ethics and
Linguistics", Pbilosophicabl Studi 37 (1980) 21- 36; "Reflective Equilibrium and
Archimedean Points", Canadian JLournal Philosophy 10 (1980) pp. 83-103. When these
essays are referred to, page numbers with "WRE", "MEL" or "RE" appended will appear
parenthetically in the text.
47
method of justification which can support the claim that there are moral facts. Section
I of this chapter is a critical examination of Daniels' reasons for dismissing the
linguistic analogy.
In section 2, I discuss Daniels' motivation for stressing similarities between methods
in natural science and ethics. I argue there is one important respect in which the
linguistic analogy fulfills Daniels' purposes. One argument against the claim that
there are moral facts rests upon the claim that there is widespread moral
disagreement. Disagreement on ethical issues seems to be more pervasive than
disagreement on scientific issues. Agreement in judgment which is produced by
legitimate methods of inquiry is taken to be important evidence for truth, so if the
prospects for resolution of moral disagreement by such methods are dim, we lack some
important evidence for the claim that there are moral facts. The prospects for
resolution of moral disagreements produced by legitimate methods of inquiry are dim if
there is reason to believe that on the best account of the justification of moral theories,
we are equally justified in holding contradictory ethical beliefs when everything the
account deems to be evidence for or against the beliefs is considered. We are not
equally justified in holding contradictory ethical beliefs if we have reason to believe
that one of the beliefs is distorted or is held on the basis of some distorted belief, and
other things are equal. Pretheoretical and theoretical moral judgments seem to be more
subject to distortion than non-moral observations and theories are, and so there should
be a significant role for an account of the distortions of moral judgments to play in the
justification of moral theories. It is plausible to suppose that many disagreements are
traceable to distortion, so the prospects for resolution of such moral disagreement by
legitimate methods of inquiry are greater when accounts of distortion play a
significant role in the methods of inquiry. A linguistic analogy is instructive in this
respect for methods in ethics.
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1. Daniels on the Linguistics Analogy
Rawls proposed a procedure for arriving at a justified moral theory that relies on
coherence as a criterion for justification of moral beliefs. Norman Daniels offers a
succinct description of the procedure, called the method of wide reflective equilibrium:
A wide reflective equilibri'im is a coherent ordered triple
of sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely a set
of considered moral judgments, (a), a set of moral
principles (b); and a set of relevant background theories,
(c). We collect the person's initial moral judgments and
filter them to include only those of which he is relatively
confident and which have been made under tonditions
generally conducive to avoiding errors in judgment. We
propose alternative sets of moral principles which have
varying degrees of "fit" with the moral judgments.,we
advance philosophical arguments which reveal the
strengths and weaknesses of the competing sets of
principles.,.The agent may work back and forth, revising
his initial judgments, moral principles, and background
theories, to arrive at an equilibrium point which consists
of the triple, (a), (b), and (c). (RE pp. 85-6)
In A Theory of J.•isti Rawls explicates this procedure and makes two significant
comparisons between the development of moral theories and the development of
linguistic theories. First, he suggests that we should provisionally understand moral
philosophy as an attempt to describe our moral sensibility, much as linguists attempt to
describe our grammatical competency:
Now one may think of moral philosophy at first...as the
attempt to describe our moral capacity...a conception of
justice captures our moral sensibility when the everyday
judgments we do make are in accordance with its
principles. These principles can serve as part of the
premises of an argument which arrives at the matching
judgments. We do not understand our sense of justice
until •. know in some systematic way covering a wide
range of cases what these principles are. Only a deceptive
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familiarity with our everyday judgmen.s and our natural
readiness to make them couid conceal the fact that
characterizing our moral capacities is an intricate task
The principles which describe them must be presumed to
have a complex structure, and the concepts involved will
require serious study..A useful comparison here is with
the problem of describing the sense of grammaticalness
that we have for the sentences for our native language
In this case the aim is to characterize the ability to
recognize well-formed sentences by formulating clearly-
expressed principles which make the same
discriminations as the native speaker. This is a difficult
undertaking which, although still unfinished, is known to
require theoretical constructions that far outrun the ad
hoc precepts of our explicit grammatical knowledge A
similar situation presumably holds in moral philosophy
There is no reason to assume that our sense of justice can
be adequately characterized by familiar common sense
precepts, or derived from the more obvious learning
principles. A correct account of moral capacities will
certainly involve principles and theoretical constructions
which go much beyond the norms and standards cited in
everyday life...6
Rawls makes a second comparison between moral theory and linguistic theory in
discussing the possibility of revisions in our considered judgments about justice:
In describing our sense of justice an allowance must be
made for the likelihood that considered judgments are no
doubt subject to certain irregularities and distortions
despite the fact that they are rendered under favorable
circumstances, When a person is presented with an
intuitively appealing account of his sense of justice.. he
may well revise his judgments to conform to its
principles, even though the theory does not fit his
existing judgments exactly. He is especially likely to do
this if he can find an explanatio- for the deviations
which undermines his confidencd in his original
judgments and if the conception yields a judgment which
he finds he can now accept.. Moral philosophy is Socratic:
we may want to change our present considered judgments
once their regulative principles are brought to light And
we may want to do this even though these principles are a
perfect fit. A knowledge of these principles may suggest
further reflections that lead us to revise our judgments.
This feature is not peculiar though to moral philosophy,
or to the study of philosophical principles, such as those
of induction and scientific method For example, while we
may not expect a substantial revision of our sense of
6 Rawls, pp. 46-7.
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correct grammar in view of a linguistic theory the
principles of which seem especially natural to us, such a
change is not inconceivable, and no doubt our sense of
grammaticalness may be affected to some degree anyway
by this knowledge. 7
Despite Rawls' claims about revisability, critics8 argued that if we understand the
coherentist methodology in ethics as on a par with methodology in linguistics, the
method gives too much authority to people's considered moral judgments. One effect of
this is that there is too little room for revision of pre-theoretical considered moral
judgments to count as an adequate account of the development of a justified moral
theory. We expect a moral theory to be critical of at least some pre-theoretical,
considered moral judgments, and we do not expect considered moral judgments to be the
final arbiters in determining the correctness of an ethical theory in the way that it is
supposed that, for example, speaker's intuitive judgments of grammaticality are the
final arbiters in determining the correctness of a theory of grammar. Wide
disagreement in pretheoretical moral judgments dictates that more than minimal
revisions in judgments are needed in order to avoid countenancing several
inconsistent claims as equally justified.
Daniels, in defending Rawls' coherentist methodology, recommends that the
linguistic analogy be dispensed with. He claims that seeing methods in ethics as
strongly parallel to those in linguistics suggests that the grounds to which we may
appeal in revising considered moral judgments are far narrower than what is actually
legitimate. He suggests that the coherentist methodology advocated by Rawls should be
seen as parallel to methodology in the natural sciences, in which revisability of both
observational judgments and theories on the basis of their coherence with a wide
7 Rawls,pp. 48-9.
Namely Hare and Nagel, at the places in the works cited above
51
range of background beliefs and theories can be countenanced,9 Among the
background theories that can force revision in moral judgments, according to Rawls'
account, are a theory of the person, general social theory, and a theory of the role of
morality in society.
Daniels' objection to the linguistic analogy centers around two issues: (1) the
revisability of considered moral judgments and (2) the reliability of considered moral
judgments. I argue that neither issue provides strong grounds for rejecting the
linguistic model for reflective equilibrium in etnics. Section la considers Daniels'
discussion of (1), section lb considers his discussion of (2).
Ia. Revisability
In "On Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics" Daniels argues that analogies made
between Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium and methods in linguistics are
"unnecessary, or, at least, overstated". (MEL, p. 21). Much worse, he fears that too much
reliance on this analogy fuels the view that those who believe that employing the
method of reflective equilibrium in ethics can lead to justified moral theories confuse
moral anthropology with moral philosophy. (MEL, p. 21). Linguistics is concerned with
what people say since linguistic theories are theories about natural languages and
natural languages are used by people to communicate. If ethical theories are concerned
with what people say about ethics (that is, their considered moral judgments) for
analogous reasons, then it seems that ethical theories are theories about people's
ethical beliefs, and ethical theories are anthropological studies of various systems of
9 See especially his "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics"
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ethical beliefs held by people. On this view, reflective equilibrium does not support the
claim that there are moral facts independent of moral beliefs. Daniels believes that this
is a misunderstanding of what employing reflective equilibrium in ethics implies, and
it is best avoided by distinguishing methods in ethics from those in linguistics. He
believes that we can distinguish methods in ethics from those in linguistics by noting
that "the revisability of considered moral judgments does not hinge on the formulation
of an appropriate competence-performance distinction". (MEL, p. 27). A second
important point is that "the target of such equilibrium is not just the explication of a
person's actual moral competency". (MEL, p. 27). This section is a critical discussion of
these claims. I think that we can grant both of Daniels' points and still maintain that
the analogy is useful. A further point relevant to the issue of the revisability of moral
judgments hinges on Daniels' claim that a natural scientific model for reflective
equilibrium in ethics is superior to the linguistics model. An important respect in
which he alleges that the revisability of moral judgments goes beyond the revisability
of speaker judgments serves equally to distinguish ethics from methods in the natural
sciences.
Roughly, we can understand the analogy between methods in linguistics and in
ethics in the following way: just as grammatical principles are developed to
systematize speaker intuitions about the grammaticality of sentences economically, so
general moral principles are developed to systematize moral judgments about the
rightness and wrongness and justice and injustice of acts, policies and institutions. An
immediate objection to such an analogy is that linguists are far more beholden to
speaker intuitions about grammaticality than moral theorists are to our judgments
about rightness and wrongness or justice and injustice. A linguistic theory is justified
to the extent that it matches the spontaneous judgments of the speakers of the
language. Presumably we do not wish to make the parallel remark for moral theory,
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i.e., that a moral theory is justified to the extent that it matches our moral judgments,
and in any case, the method of wide reflective equilibrium indicates otherwise.
Daniels does not wish to drive such a strong wedge between the two enterprises on
this particular point. He grants the now commonplace point that speaker intuitions
about grammaticality are widely revisable. Two examples, one of which is cited by
Daniels (MEL, p. 24), will suffice to make the point. When presented with the following
string of words. English speakers often pronounce both to be ungrammatical: "buffalo
buffalo buffalo" and "the horse raced past the barn fell",
Despite these speaker pronouncements of ungrammaticality, a little persuasion on
the part of a linguist can lead to revisions in the judgments. The former string can be
judged as grammatical if we see it as structurally similar to strings like "men admire
women". Likewise, the judgment about the latter string can be revised when the
speaker is presented with the argument that it is synonymous with "the horse that was
raced past the barn fell" and structurally similar to "the dog dragged by the collar bit
its owner".
In spite of speaker judgments to the contrary, then, we expect principles of English
grammar to count "buffalo buffalo buffalo" and "the horse raced past the barn fell"
among the grammatical strings. The fact that speaker judgments are revisable and the
fact that there are similarities between what are considered to be legitimate means of
persuading people that their linguistic and moral judgments ought to be changed seems
to narrow the gulf between linguistic and ethical theories. Persuasive moral
arguments often consist of pointing out that a judgment about a particular case is
inconsistent with judgments made about cases that are quite similar in important
respects, and so the original judgments ought to be changed, Hence, any correct moral
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principle will count the judgment of the original case in like manner with the others,
in spite of the original intuition.
Daniels believes that noticing these facts about revisability is insufficient to
resurrect the analogy, however, He believes that the grounds for revision in the
linguistic case are far too narrow and this points to a disparity in the goals of the two
enterprises that serves to deprive the analogy of its usefulness. However, pointing out
that there is a disparity in the goals of the two enterprises need not lead us to the
conclusion that an analogy between the two is not useful. The fact that linguistic
theories aim to characterize linguistic properties, while moral theories explain moral
properties, does not itself dictate that accounts of how linguistic theories are justified
bear no interesting relationship to accounts of justification in ethics. This seems
especially important to notice for someone who holds Daniels' position. Daniels wants to
maintain that there is a useful analogy between methods in ethics and methods in the
natural sciences, and yet ethical theories are not explanations of, for example,
chemical properties.
For the linguistic case, revision of initial speaker judgments is permissible only by
reference to a performance-competence distinction. Linguists have proposed that a
speaker's ability to use a language is explained by the fact that the speaker has
internalized a set of rules which the speaker exploits in producing and understanding
sequences of words. This internalized set of rules is called the speaker's competence. A
speaker utilizes this competence both when she makes a judgment about her language
and when she speaks or listens to the language. For example, she may unconsciously
apply the internalized rules to a sound sequence in order to judge whether or not it is
acceptable in her language. Such judgments count as part of a speaker's performance
and they reflect the speaker's competence when the unconscious application of rules is
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not influenced by memory limitations or special short cuts for classifying sequences of
words that generally facilitate understanding sentences but can lead a speaker astray
in ways which the speaker can be brought to realize. When these factors do influence a
speaker's performance, the performance does not reflect the speaker's competence.
We are entitled to revise an initial speaker judgment only if we can claim, for example,
that the initial judgment is a product of short-term memory limitations or the
limitations of our ordinary parsing heuristics and hence can be passed off as a
performance error rather than a judgment which is revealing of linguistic
competency.
However numerous the permissible revisions of speaker intuitions of grammaticality
may be, Daniels maintains that the revisions of our moral intuitions that are deemed
legitimate for a moral theorist (or a person seeking wide reflective equilibrium) to
make go far beyond any that might be justified by appeal to an analogous moral
competence-performance distinction. Moral theorists do not only discard or revise
those intuitions that can plausibly be regarded as products of performance errors.
According to Daniels, the theories invoked in ethics might dictate revisions of
judgments that all would agree actually do reflect the moral competence of a particular
moral agent. Daniels remarks that "At best, we might describe [the ethical theorists]
goal as seeking a hypothetical [as against an actual] competency: the one a person
would have were he to have been persuaded by such and such arguments and revise
the components of his belief system accordingly". (MEL, p. 27).
Though I am sympathetic with Daniels on this point, I don't think that it is quite as
easy to dismiss the competence-performance distinction as an adequate basis for the
revisability of ethical judgments as he seems to think. Exactly how close an analogy
between a linguistic competence and a moral competence we might expect might
influence the range of judgments we are willing to call "performance errors" in the
moral case. I think we should expect a great deal of difference between the range of
dismissable judgments in the two cases. Daniels himself seems willing to concede that
there is a plausible, very rough analogy between linguistic performance errors and
moral judgment errors which provides an acceptable rationale for revising some
judgments. He describes the two types of linguistic performance errors and suggests
some moral analogues. He calls the first type "non-linguistic" performance errors
which are those errors attributable to conditions affecting a speaker's state of mind
such as inebriation, inattention and fatigue. He considers that these performance
errors could count as roughly analogous to those moral judgmenwt initially pruned
from consideration in the method of wide reflective equilibrium because the person
seeking such equilibrium is not confident of these judgments, doesn't have adequate
information or has made the judgment "in a state of mind conducive to moral error"
(MEL p. 23). Thus, conditions that might be characterized as sheer ignorance, self-
interestedness or hatred could discount moral judgments as performance errors. These
"conditions" seem to have a much broader scope than fatigue or iniebriation in their
capacity to discount judgments. Moreover, it does seem reasonable to rule these
conditions as potentially leading to moral errors since factual knowledge, self-interest
and the emotions clearly affect our moral judgments in ways that are less likely to
affect our judgments of grammaticality.
Daniels also describes a second kind of "purely linguistic" performance error which
would be attributed to factors such as short-term memory limitations or other
processing limitations. After noting that where the performance-competence
distinction is drawn may itself be susceptible to theoretical considerations rather than
be simply obvious or initially agreed to, he suggests how a further analogy between a
performance-competence distinction in the two areas might be made:
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.With some exercise of fancy, we might find a parallel
between the appeal to the performance-competence
distinction in syntactics and an analogous distirction we
might draw for the moral case. Consider, for example,
cases in which we are led to revise moral judgments
because we realize that they are incompatible with other
judgments we hold, contrary to what we had been able to
see at first. A specially constructed moral dilemma, for
instance, might convince us that we had "overlooked"
relevant features in judging the original case. Or a
number of related cases may be shown to us, on the basis
of which we see similarities we had not seen before. We
might then say that our on-line moral processor had
failed to match our real moral competency. Here we can
suppose our moral competence-performance distinction
may be theory-dependent in ways analogous to the
theory-dependency of the syntactic version (for example,
psychological theories of attention or reasoning ability
may affect how the moral version might be drawn). (MEL
pp. 24-5)
We can imagine t sat. if the analogy that held between so-called non-linguistic
performance errors for linguistics and (non-moral) performance errors for ethics
could be so rough and allow so much more scope for dismissing moral errors, likewise
there might be a good deal more room for revision of moral as versus linguistic
judgments in this category of performance error. It is plausible that the psychology of
our moral reasoning abilities is both different from and much more complicated and
variously influenced than the psychology of our linguistic abilities Of course, in order
to give an account of ous moral reasoning abilities which can explain distortion, we
need to assume that certain moral claims we now accept are true This is uuproblematic
as a general strategy if we accept the epistemological view that our belieis can only be
justified by relying on the beliefs we already have and if the claims we rely on are not
Ipeculiar to one moral theory such that they serve to dismiss any intuitions that would
conflict with the theory.
For example, we might ascribe certain tendencies to "overlook relevant features" to
more or less circumscribed inhibition or activation of emotional responses that
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interferes with the operation of a person's moral competency. Suppove that the
capacity to empathize with others is important in making moral judgments and suppose
further that the ability to empathize requires imagining oneself in the position of the
person concerning whom a moral judgment is being made For some people, this act of
imagining carries an emotional charge, in which feelings associated with being in this
position are experienced People may be particularly averse to empathizing with
others in certain situations because, for example, they have recently (or perhaps not so
recently) escaped similar situations themselves and so the unpleasant emotional charge
is very strong They may not be particularly conscious of the aversion, or the reasons
for it, and they may simply automatically avoid empathizing fully in these situations,
and make distorted moral judgments. This may persist for a time quite unrecognized, as
those afflicted with the difficulty continue to make moral judgments in other
situations with no such interference
Another example of a tendency to "overlook relevant features" in a way that we
might characterize as an interference with competency may be the persistence of
"selective" prejudices. For example, a person who is otherwise committed to egalitarian
social arrangements nevertheless excludes the interests of women from equal
consideration in these arrangements This exclusion may be due to the person's
difficulty in regarding women as having interests separate from interests in fulfilling
subordinate social roles. In at least some cases, this may not be explainable simply by
noting that, in the society in which the person lives, sexism functions in such a way
that women have fewer social resources than men and so Ikss frequently develop
abilities not directly related to serving others, which leads the person to the belief that
women lack the capacity for self-determination This explanation would be inadequate
if the person did not in general infer a lack of capacity for self-determination from a
relatively low level of socially-recognized achievement as d in general tended to notice
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the significance of social barriers. The difficulty in regarding women as self-
determining may be the result of unconscious, emotionally-tinged associations of
women with the role of caretakers, which can exert a particularly strong and primitive
pull on people because a child's relationship to a mother forms a basis for a sense of
security, and women usually have had sole or primary caretaking responsiblities for
children
The question of exactly at what point we must stop calling a certain "lapse" a
performance error and consider it part of the person's moral competence no doubt
would have important implications for what ethical theories are acceptable, if the
deliverances of moral competencies are seen as important evidence for what ethical
theories are true. However, this need not disqualify the notion of such performance
errors as hopelessly biased toward particular theories even as it gives enormous room
for revision of judgments beyond the linguistic analogue. If independently of the
evaluation of a particular moral theory (for example, on the basis of shared pre-
theoretical assumptions or claims common to many different ethical theories), we have
reason to believe that there are certain requirements for the ability to make moral
judgments and that there are certain identifiable factors that can interfere with this
ability over a period of time, we need not assume that the notion of a performance
error is simply an ad hoc device for discarding discrepent judgments.
Revision of moral judgments on the basis of a ralal competence-performance
distinction might then be much more extensive than revision of speaker judgments on
the basis of a linguistic competence-performance distinction The extent of
revisability of judgments is not itself a clear ground for dismissing the linguistics
analogy. Daniels might not accept that revision of moral judgments on the grounds of a
moral analogue to the competence-performance distinction would be as extensive as I
60
have suggested, Nevertheless, he suggests that the linguistic analogy should be
dismissed not only because there may be insufficient revisability of moral judgments
provided for, but rather because the gr8ouns for revisability in the linguistic case are
limited to appeal to a competence-performance distinction
It is worthwhile to consider why Daniels thinks that limiting revisions to those
defensible on the grounds of a competence-performance distinction is objectionable
We might not find it objectionable since it is not clear how restrictive this limitation
has to be We need not think that revision of all moral judgments must be justified on
the basis of a competence-performance distinction if we accept the linguistic model
Daniels subscribes to the view that non-moral judgments can be more or less theory-
dependent. Linguistic or moral judgments might likewise be more or less theory-
dependent and permissible revisions could vary with this status. The linguistic
judgments that linguistic theories dismiss on the basis of a competence-performance
distinction are not usually judgments that speakers accept because they have
considered certain linguistic theories Typically only the least the'sry-dependent
linguistic judgments (speaker's spontaneous, untutored judgments) are dismissed for
this reason. In the development of linguistic theory, other linguistic judgments, such
as the theoretical judgments made by linguists, are dismissed for their inconsistency
with other theories or with speaker judgments. So perhaps according to the linguistic
model only the revisions of the least theory-dependent moral judgments are limited to
those grounded on a competence-performance distinction. Perhaps the more theory-
dependent a judgment is, the more revision on the basis of coherence with background
theory is legitimate (though even here, the competence-performance distinction may
play a role), and the less theory- dependent it is, the more our grounds for dismissing
it are limited to claims of distortion. I cannot offer guidelines for determining when a
moral judgment is more or less theory-dependent, but one index of low theory-
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dependency may be that the judgment is generally accepted by people who have
widely differing theoretical orientations.
On this interpretation, the linguistic analogy only suggests that the grounds for
revision of certai moral judgments be limited to those that can be justified on the basis
of a moral competence-performance distinction. These moral judgments would be the
least theory-dependent moral judgments that can support a moral theory and as such
may be compared with observational reports that serve as evidence for scientific
theories. This is not to say that all moral judgments are not more theory-dependent
than observational judgments, but simply that the least theory dependent moral
judgments have a justificatory role for moral theories that is similar to the
justificatory role of observational statements for scientific theories. The limitation to
revision on the basis of a compe'ence-performance distinction may seem less
objectionable under this interpretation. Observational judgments are extensively
revisable, but generally only on the grounds that they are a product of a "performance
error" - e.g., some limitation or impairment of observers' perceptual abilities, In the
absence of these grounds, as Daniels suggests (MEL, p 31), we may simply choose to
ignore certain observational reports that conflict with a wide body of other
observational reports and widely accepted theory, with the hope that certain other
theories can account for them. But it is important to realize that in this case we do not
have strong grounds for their revision.
Daniels' objection to limiting the grounds for revision of m ral ludgments to those
defensible by a competence-performance distinction also may depend upon a
questionable construal of linguistic evidence. Daniels claims that theories in linguistics
should be distinguished from theories in ethics on the grounds that, while theories in
linguistics force revisions of speaker judgments only to the extent that such revision
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reflects actual speaker competence, theories in ethics "force us to choose.. hich among
alternatives we want to see realized in persons". (MEL p. 27). Something of an
explication if this remark is suggested in a quotation I cited earlier. Daniels claims that
in ethics we are either not actually trying to describe a competency or we are seeking a
"hypothetical competency: the one a person would have were he to be persuaded by
such and such arguments and revise the components of his belief system accordingly"
(MEL p. 27). Daniels is assuming that, since theories in linguistics force revisions of
speaker judgments only to the extent that such revision reflects actual speaker
competence, theories in linguistics must be theories about speakers' competence. But
even if the only speaker judgments that linguistic theories account for are speaker
judgments that reflect speaker competence, we needn't conclude that linguistic
theories are theories about speaker competence. Speaker judgments that reflect
speaker competence may be the best evidence for linguistic theories because we have
good reason to believe that these judgments are true. Linguistic theories may account
for speaker judgments not because linguistic theories are explanations of intuitingg
(or of the fact that speakers have these judgments), and thus posit a competency to
account for this, but rather because they are explanztions of intuiteds (or linguistic
facts about grammaticality, ambiguity and synonymy expressed in speaker judgments
that there is reason to believe are true). So Daniels' claim that in ethics we are not
actually trying to describe a competency at all need not separate ethics from
linguistics.
Finally, an ad hominem point is that Daniels' alternative suggestion that ethics
should be distinguished from linguistics because in ethics we are trying to characterize
not an actual, but a hypothetical, competency does not fit well with other claims he
makes about methods of justification in ethics. While he discounts the analogy with
linguistics, Daniels claims that analogies with methods of justification in the natural
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sciences are more apt. But it seems that many sciences aside from linguistics are
concerned with actual, as opposed to hypothetical, objects of study. Of course,
hypothetical situations are characterized or idealized descriptions might be offered as a
means to the best approximation of actual situations or objects. But in any case, this
particular use of hypothetical situations or idealizations is not one that Daniels rules
out for the case of linguistics. It doesn't seem as though any science pursues a
characterization of an analogue to the hypothetical competency that Daniels describes,
so it should come as no surprise if linguistics doesn't.
Following a suggestion that Daniels makes in a slightly different context (RE, p. 95),
we might see this hypothetical competency as an ideal competency in a sense which is
different from an empirical idealization of actual moral competency. That is, the
hypothetical moral competency need not be simply a competency which abstracts from
certain distortions in actual moral competencies which we can account for by other
theories (of self-interest or pathological personality, for example). It may be simply
the moral competency that we think sah&h to be realized in persons and the pursuit of a
characterization of this kind of ideal (as opposed to empirical idealization) is foreign to
linguistics even if linguistics is concerned with characterizing a competency. I take
the point of Daniels' claim to be that moral considerations (that is, any moral claims
contained in background theories that principles must cohere with) constrain the
choice of moral principles. But if normative (moral) considerations constrain the
choice of moral principles, then the constraints on choice of moral principles are
different from the constraints on the choice of natural scientific theories as well as
syntactic theories. Thus, on this picture, there is no special shortcoming of the
linguistic model for understanding justification in ethics which might be remedied by
adopting a natural scientific model, as Daniels seems to suggest.
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lb. Reliability
Daniels claims that methods in linguistics most resemble what he follows Rawls in
calling a method of narrow reflective equilibrium. (MEL pp. 23-5;WRE p. 258 n.4). He
takes this to suggest that any analogy between methods in linguistics and methods in
ethics would have unacceptable implications about the epistemological status of our
moral iudgments. I argue that, even if we grant his claim about linguistics, narrow
reflective equilibrium does not have these implications, and his own conception of
methods is not superior in avoiding them. Moreover, it is not clear that methods in
linguistics are best seen as a narrow reflective equilibrium. A narrow reflective
equilibrium is an ordered pair consisting of a set of considered mural judgments that
are acceptable to a person at a given time and a set of moral principles that systematizes
them. We arrive at this ordered pair by taking a person's initial moral judgments,
eliminating those we have some reason to believe are not credible (for example, those
made in great ignorance of relevant detail or in a state of agitation), developing
principles to systematize and extend them and further eliminating judgments that do
not fit with the best principles. Daniels favors an alternative conception of methods
for developing a moral theory, called wide reflective equilibrium. A wide reflective
equilibrium is an ordered triple which consists of a set of considered moral judgments,
a set of moral principles and a set of relevant background theories, which Rawls
proposes and Daniels concurs include a theory of the person, general social theory and
a theory of the role of morality in society, Achieving a wide reflective equilibrium
involves proposing alternative sets of principles to fit moral judgments made in
circumstances favorable to making undistorted moral judgments, assessing these
alternatives in the light of their fit with b;ckground theories, and making adjustments
in judgments, principles and background theories to achieve the most coherent system.
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Achieving a narrow equilibrium differs from achieving a wide equilibrium in that the
latter does not merely require that we arrive at the most coherent system of acceptable
initial judgments and principles but that we arrive at principles that both systematize
judgments and are found to cohere best with the background theories. Some initial
judgments may be dropped, then, for example because they do not fit with the one
principle of competing principles that does the best overall job of both systematizin g
our judgments and fitting well with background theories. Or a principle may be
discarded because it does not fit with a background theory.
Daniels thinks that an important problem for narrow reflective equilibrium as an
account of how moral theories may be justified (and by implication a shortcoming of
the linguistic analogy), is that merely constraining moral principles to cohere with
our moral judgments is insufficient justification for them unless we wish to grant
"privileged epistemological status" to our moral judgments. (WRE, p. 264). Cohering
with beliefs that have privileged epistemological status were there any would count as
justification for moral theories, but cohering with beliefs, for example, we simply
happen to believe does not.
One motive for rejecting the linguistic analogy and narrow reflective equilibrium is
then to avoid the need to grant privileged epistemological status to considered moral
judgments. We may wish to avoid granting privileged epistemological status to moral
judgments either because we believe that granting privileged epistemological status to
certain beliefs commits us to foundationalism or because there is something
particularly troubling about granting privileged epistemological status to moral
beliefs. Daniels d,. s not fully discuss what he means by the "privileged
epistemological status" required of moral judgments in order to make narrow reflective
equilibrium a possible account of justification for moral theory. In another context he
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talks about "privileged" data and indicates that by "privileged" he means either
completely reliable or unrevisable. (MEL p. 32). Let us assume for the moment that this
is what he means by the "privileged epistemological status" of moral judgments.
To claim that a certain set of beliefs is completely reliable need not commit us to
foundationalism. Foundationalism is the view that a certain set of beliefs does not
require justification by any other beliefs and is the basis for the justification of all
other beliefs. We can claim that completely reliable beliefs require justification by
other beliefs, perhaps by beliefs about why they are reliable. 10 So the worry about
privileged epistemological status may be unrelated to foundationalism
Alternatively, there is a particular worry about claiming that moral beliefs have
privileged epistemological status if this means that they are completely reliable or
unrevisable. As Daniels points out, we are well aware of how susceptible to bias moral
judgments are. But neither the linguistic analogy nor narrow reflective equilibrium
suggests that moral teliefs are completely reliable or unrevisable. Moral beliefs can be
unreliable when made by someone "in a state of mind conducive to moral error", Moral
beliefs can be revised because they do not fit the principle that most economically
systematizes them. Unless coherence with completely reliable or unrevisable moral
judgments is the only satisfactory account of justification for a theory arrived at using
narrow reflective equilibrium, the claim that moral beliefs are neither completely
reliable nor unrevisable does not count against narrow reflective equilibrium. I see no
reason why nothing short of coherence with completely reliable moral judgments
should be required, unless the method of narrow reflective equilibrium is understood to
allow for theories that are inconsistent with other non-moral beliefs that we have some
0to See David Brink's discussion of foundationalism and reliable beliefs in his Mtral
Realism AL th Foundations of thics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.
118.
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reason to believe are true, though these non-moral beliefs are not completely reliable
nor are based upon beliefs that are completely reliable. Again, I see no reason why this
particular stipulation is required.
It may be objected that narrow reflective equilibrium does require complete
reliability of considered moral judgments. Among the moral beliefs that are
systematized by moral principles in accord with narrow equilibrium there wou'd not be
any that we have reason to believe are unreliable because, for example, they are made
in a state of mind conducive to moral error. The method stipulates that these are
eliminated prior to systematization. However, stipulating that this elimination takes
place does not imply that considered moral judgments are completely reliable. It only
implies that we have more reason to believe that this set of judgments is reliable than
we have to believe the set prior to the elimination is reliable.
Daniels admits that neither complete reliability nor unrevisability of moral
judgments need be part of narrow reflective equilibrium or linguistic method, given
the room for pruning judgments at the outset and some adjustments to principles. He
claims that what makes narrow reflective equilibrium inadequate is that it does not
allow for "drastic theory-based revision". (WRE, p. 268). I take it that theory-based
revision is revision of judgments based upon moral or non-moral theory. If
psychological, sociological or historical theories are needed to support claims about
distortion, then revision on the basis of distortion can count as (non-moral) theory-
based. If moral theory must be developed to some extent in order to determine the
content of moral claims, and this plays a role in determining how we might be distorted
in our moral judgments, revision on the basis of distortion can be (moral) theory-
based. For example, if, according to a moral theory, some moral judgments concern the
consequences of our actions on others, we may conclude that some degree of empathic
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understanding of others is required in order to make reliable moral judgments. In this
case, moral theory and theories about the circumstances under which empathic
understanding is blocked might give (moral and non-moral) theory-based grounds for
revision. Certainly a linguistic analogy would sustain the possiblity of theory-based
revision. Daniels himself admits that theoretical considerations play a role in
determining where the distinction between competence and performance may be
drawn. (MEL, p. 24). So either linguistic methods do not count as narrow reflective
equilibrium, or narrow reflective equilibrium can countenance theory-based
revision.11 If the latter is true, narrow reflective equilibrium in ethics may be
perfectly able to accomodate this type of revision as theories develop over time.
Determining what states of mind or circumstances are conducive to moral error seems
to require both moral and non-moral theory. Thus the linguistic analogy need not
commit us to too strong a claim about the reliability of moral judgments by disallowing
theory-based revision of judgments.
A different objection to the linguistic model for justification is, not that it commits us
to too strong a claim about the reliability of moral judgments, but rather tOat it gives us
no reason whatsoever to believe that they are reliable. This claim stems from an
objection made by Richard Brandt 12 to the method of reflective equilibrium. Brandt
argues that the only condition under which we would find the method of reflective
equilibrium satisfactory as an account of justification is when we have some reason to
believe confidently in our initial set of judgments which is independent from the fact
11 The point about narrow reflective equilibrium's compatibility with the use of non-
moral theories to effect revision in moral judgments is argued for in Margaret
Holmgren, "The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium", Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 19 (1989) pp. 43-60,
12 Richard Brandt, A Thn of ht 2Qoo ad • Righi (New York, Oxford University
Press, 1979) p. 20.
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that they cohere with the principles that best systematize them. A paradigm case of a
judgment which we can confidently believe in for a reason which io independent of its
status as evidence for the principle we believe best accounts for it is a judgment which
purports to state a fact of observation. Our independent reason is that these judgments
are generally reliable, and we are confident of this because we can offer a causal story
involving our perceptual mechanisms to explain our detection of observational
properties. If there is no such story for our initial moral judgments, Brandt's argument
implies that the credibility of the set of moral judgments and principles arrived at
through reflective equilibrium is doubtful.
Daniels claims that Brandt's criticism would discredit narrow and wide reflective
equilibrium equally if it were tenable. However, Daniels seems to think that the
objection is best answered if we accept wide reflective equilibrium as the method of
justification in ethics. If he is right, and the linguistic :aodel is best seen as a narrow
reflective equilibrium, then this is grounds for rejecting the linguistic model. He
suggests that it seems reasonable to maintain that we will only be able to tell a
reliability story about our initial considered judgments after a good deal of development
of acceptable moral theory in wide reflective equilibrium, He contends that the only
reason we are able to assign initial credibility to observation reports is that we already
have a broadly developed body of theory which explains why the reports are credible
The unfavorable comparison between observation reports and the considered moral
judgments with which we begin constructing a moral tneory is unfair for this reason.
Daniels' argument concedes something to Brandt and yet attempts to circumvent
coming to the conclusion that considered moral judgments are not a proper starting
point for mor.l theories. We can summarize it as follows; The only reason we are able
to give initial credibility to observation statements (as opposed to more theoretical
statements) is because we have causal reliability stories for these statements. Some
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such reliability story is owed for moral judgments. But the causal reliability stories for
observation statements only became available with the development of scientific
theories. Thus, we should only expect such a story for moral judgments to emerge with
the development of moral theory.
I think that there is room to dispute Daniels here. It isn't clear that the only reason
we are able to give initial credibility to observation statements is because we have the
causal reliability stories made available with the development of scientific theories to
this point That is, the detailed knowledge Jhat we now have about our perceptual
mechanisms need not be a prerequisite for granting credibility to them. We may give
initial credibility to obaervation statements based upon widespread agreement to them,
as well as the knowledge that certain conditions that tend to produce widely discrepant
judgments do not obtain. Perhaps, as certain factcrs that affect our perceptual
mechanisms become better understood, we might be more or less inclintd to grant
credibility to ce tain observations or certain kinds of observations. But this is not, I
think, what Daniels has in mind. It may be that observations play more of a role in
scientific theories than they did at some previous time, but if so this seems to be less an
issue of gaining credibility than of coming to understand their relevance to certain
questions. It is not clear that we need to accept the view that scientific theories only
now give a justification for granting credibility to observations in general which was
lacking previously. Exactly how much development of theory is necessary for
granting initial credibility to observations is an open question, subject to perhaps
degree of agreement on the judgments and how well these judgments may cohere with
other judgments for which we have justification. The linguistics case is parthcularly
interesting to consider in this context. We give initial credibility to speaker intuitions
about grammaticality, ambiguity and synonymy without benefit of any complete story
about how such judgments could be reliable (that is, any full specification of the
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workings of our language faculty) aside from filtering out some conditions which
would make the judgments obviously unreliable
Even if we were convinced that assigning initial credibility to moral judgments
requires a specification of our ability to detect moral properties, it is not obvious that
achieving wide reflective equilibrium is the only means to arrive at such a
specification Daniels claims that it is plausible to suppose that the requisite stories
about reliable detection of moral properties will only be possible when we have a better
idea about what kind of fact a moral fact is, and we will only have such an idea when
moral theory has developed in wide reflective equilibrium. (WRE. p. 271). However, we
might have a sufficient idea of what kind of fact a moral fact is to give an account of
our ability to detect moral properties without relying on a highly detailed development
of moral theory in wide reflective equilibrium. To determine what moral properties
are and how we detect them, we may look instead at moral claims most commonly
accepteC. by a range of (perhaps not very well-developed) moral theories and show
their connertion with properties we can detect. For example, justice is a moral
property which may be linked to social stability, and our detection of social stability is
reasonably unproblematic Moreover, it is unclear why narrow reflective equilibriuL.
cannot provide any answers to what kind of fact a moral fact is, which we then might
be able to use in an account of how we came to detect moral properties. 13 It is true that
employing the method of narrow (moral) reflective equilibrium will not itself produce
an account of our moral detection mechanisms since any such account is a non-moral
theory, but arriving at a moral theory using narrow reflective equilibrium need not
somehow prevent us from being able to develop a theory of moral detection
mechanisms. Narrow reflective equilibrium may provid? everything that the moral
13 !ee Holmgren, p. ,19.
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component of wide reflective equilibrium provides toward a theory of moral detection
mechanisms. if that simply has to be an idea of what kind of fact a moral fact is
Daniels offers a second argument against Brandt's claim that we cannoct attach
credibility to a system of moral judgments and principles that are justified on the basis
of their coherence with moral judgments He argues that the force that Brandt's claim
has depends upon the comparison of observation reports and moral judgments, but
observation reports and moral judgments are so unlike one another that we ought not
to expect any stories about the reliability of moral judgments to resemble the kinds of
stories we tell about observation reports. He claims that moral judgments are in many
ways far more like theoretical statements than observation statements. He believes that
some evidence for this claim comes from noticing the contrast between how we
actually support moral judgments and how we support observational judgments when
called upon to justify them in everyday contexts The only "reasons" we give in the
observational case refer to satisfactory conditions for viewing, whereas in the moral
case we invoke more or less theoretical claims that connect a moral with non-moral or
other moral properties. Daniels concludes that the moral properties mentioned in the
considered moral judgments that are our starting points for moral theories (for
example, justice and injustice) are not simple properties and so they will not play a role
"analogous to that played by observational properties in the causal reliability stories
we tell ourselves concerning observation reports" (WRE, p. 271) Presumably then the
dissimilarity between . servational and moral properties is grounds for claiming that
we should not expect the same sorts of justification for theories whose primary
evidence is observational statements and theories whose primary evidence is moral
judgments
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The fact that there is a difference in the kinds of properties mentioned in
observational and moral judgments doesn't itself say anything about what our
expectations of a causal reliability story should be. Brandt only claims, in effect, that
we do have causal reliability stories for observations, but not for the considered moral
judgments with which we begin theory construction, and we do need some such story
Daniels seems to be assuming that anyone making Brandt's point is implying that
reflective equilibrium in ethics can only be an account of justification if we claim that
there is some sort of perceptual apparatus for sensing moral properties, and the
implausibility of this casts doubt on reflective equilibrium. If Daniels is right, then
perhaps here the linguistic analogy would serve him well. Grammaticality, synonymy
and ambiguity are unlikely to be "simple" properties of utterances or sentences. We
have not discovered a perceptual ortgan for sensing linguistic properties. Yet we
consider linguistic theories whose primary evidence comes from speaker judgments
about grammaticality, synonymy, and ambiguity to be justified
I do not mean to suggest that the judgments that count as evidence for ethics and
linguistics are necessarily on the same footing epistemologically I only mean to
suggest that Daniels' position against Brandt can be strengthened by pointing out an
actual case of an area of inquiry in which our grounds for accepting the primary
evidence for the theory are likely to be somewhat different from our grounds for
accepting observation reports The details of when and how speaker intuitions about
grammaticality are reliable are not as well worked out nor as uncontroversial as
reliability stories for observations are Whatever stories finally do emerge, it is
reasonable to expect them to look different from reliability stories for observations
Nevertheless, even though we lack these stories and we can assume reasonably that
they will be different from stories about observations, this does not seem to affect
seriously our conviction that particular linguistic theories may be justified at least
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partly on the basis of their account of linguistic intuitions. This seems to undercut the
implicit claim that having grounds for accepting initial evidence that are the same as
grounds for accepting observation reports is required for the credibility of any system
of coherent principles and judgments
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2. Reflective Equilibrium and Scientific Methodology
Daniels contends that adopting the linguistic model for reflective equilibrium in
ethics makes the claim that methods in ethics resemble methods in other sciences less
plausible. He thinks that the parallel between science and ethics is important in two
respects. First, sciences other than linguistics "emphasize theory construction as the
basis for evaluating" particular judgments, and this is a significant feature of wide
reflective equilibrium as a method for ethics. (MEL p. 33). Second, the similarities in
methods may lend credence to claims about objectivity in ethics parallel to those in
science. I argue that the linguistic model suggests a feature of justification which is
important to the question of objectivity in ethics, and the importance of this feature is
somewhat obscured on the natural science model as Daniels describes it.
The claim that wide reflective equilibrium emphasizes that theory construction is a
major basis for ei aluating considered moral judgments may be supported in a few
different ways, First, considered moral judgments are not, from the outset, stipulated as
completely reliable or unrevisable such that moral theories must simply accommodate
them. Rather, considered moral judgments can be evaluated on the basis of how they
accord with ethical principles. We have seen how this does not distinguish moral
theories from linguistic theories. Second, acceptance of ethical principles, and thus
acceptance of moral judgments, is constrained by coherence with background moral
and non-moral theories.
Daniels suggests that we can see the background theories in wide reflective
equilibrium as providing independent support for moral principles in the way that the
body of interconnected scientific theories provides support for a candidate scientific
law. This independent support might take the form of a demonstration that only one
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among many different candidate principles that systematize initial considered moral
judgments is consistent with a background theory. For example, one of the background
theories that Rawls suggests constrains a choice of a moral principle is a theory of the
role of morality in society. Daniels argues that this theory, combined with a theory of
the person, may yield the claim that principles of justice must be principles that could
regulate a society by constitituting a public conception of justice which is in fact
accepted by everyone and is satisfied by basic social institutions. (RE, pp. 90-3). Any
principles of justice which could not meet the publicity constraint lack the support of
this background theory, and those that do meet this constraint are supported by the
theory. A considered moral judgment might then be evaluated on the basis of its
coherence with principles that cohere with a theory of the role of morality in society.
The second motivation for Daniels' insistence on the analogy to scientific methods is
a hope that the methodological considerations which are alleged to lend credence to
certain claims about objectivity in science will do the same for ethics. First, Daniels
holds out the hope that adhering to the method of wide reflective equilibrium will
result in greater moral agreement. The relative complexity of wide reflective
equilibrium (as opposed to narrow refective equilibrium) may enable us to trace
alleged disagreements on moral judgments to background theory, and Daniels believes
that disagreements about theory hold more promise of resolution than disagreements
about principles or judgments Consensus may thus be produced by coherence
constraints which bear some resemblence to the kinds of coherence constraints in
science. Daniels is attached to a version of scientific realism which claims that certain
methodological features of science produce consensus because they lead us to better
approximations of the truth If these coherence constraints are among these
methodological features and similar ones operate to produce consensus in ethics,
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then"we have some reason to think that wide reflective equilibrium involves methods
that will lead us to objective moral truths,. if tb art any " (WRE, p. 230).
Daniels considers this suggestion to be a tentative one, and so admits that he has not
established that the alleged philosophical gains to be made for claims about objectivity
for science are transferrable to ethics on the basis of similarities noted in science and
ethics. The success of this strategy for making progress in justifying claims about
objectivity is contingent upon discovering other similarities between ethics and
science, Daniels believes that the arguments for scientific realism depend upon a
causal theory of knowledge which, for example, invokes the existence of reliable
detection mechanisms in an account of perceptual knowledge. However, Daniels
considers the fact that we have no persuasive account of a moral analogue to such
reliable detection mechanisms to be a problem. Moreover, he is willing to entertain the
hypothesis that our causal accounts of knowledge may themselves be unpersuasive. and
in that case one of the motivations for maintaining the analogy between science and
ethics would no longer obtain.
The natural science model for understanding methods of justification in ethics may
be superior to a linguistic model in suggesting that a wide range of background
theories are relevant to revision of judgments in the way that Daniels suggests The
linguistic analogy does seem to suggest that there is little room for revision and
criticism of our pre-theoretical moral judgments op the basis of their coherence with
background theories not directly linked with distortion. However, Rawls suggests that
in ethics, theories about distortion have a special role to play in the likelihood of
revision of belief. He claims that a person is especially likely to revise moral
judgments to conform to principles if there are explanations for the judgments that
deviate from the principles and the explanations undermine confidence in the
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judgments. This remark has been largely ignored both by critics of reflective
equilibrium and Daniels himself. However, Rawls' suggestion points to a potentially
important feature of accounts of justification in ethics. The linguistic analogy may
serve to legitimate the special importance of these claims by drawing attention to the
fact that certain kinds of judgments can be prone to types of distortion that are
uncommon for other kinds of judgments. This is important, since heavy reliance on
claims about distortion may tend to cast doubt on theories.
The natural science model for the method of developing a moral theory suggests that
a moral theory initially attempts to account for certain judgments which we have some
reason to believe independently of the fact that the theory accounts for them. in the
moral case, these judgments are more or less spontaneous moral judgments. In the
scientific case, the judgments a theory must account for include observational and
theoretical non-moral judgments. We can have reason to believe non-moral
observational judgments independently of a particular scientific theory since we have
reason to believe that observation is reliable, and we can have reason to believe some
theoretical judgments independently of the theory attempting to account for them if
they are supported by other theories which we have reason to believe, perhaps because
they account for certain observations If ethical or scientific theories are justifiable,
then there must be some reason to believe that the judgments they account for are
more or less reliable, though not necessarily infallible. If the factors that influence
the reliability of considered moral judgments are not the same as those that influence
non-moral observations and theoretical judgments, and we cannot expect constraints to
cohere with beliefs and theories that do not concern the reliability of moral judgments
to eliminate unreliable moral judgments, the justification of ethical judgments and
theories diverges from justification in the natural sciences in an important respect
This holds even if reflective equilibrium is the correct account of justification
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If the initial judgments (moral or non.-moral) with which theories are presumed to
cohere are very susceptible to distortion and we could not specify the conditions under
which we could consider them reliable, correct for the distortion or rule the judgments
out, then the requirement that these judgments must cohere with judgments and
theories that do not concern this distortion does not give us a reason to believe that
such theories are justified. When Daniels speaks about the natural science model, I
assume that he has the justification of theories of physics, chemistry and possibly
biology in mind, rather than, for example, justification of theories of sociology, history
or economics. Considered ethical judgments appear to be much more subject to
distortion than non-moral observational and theoretical judgments for which theories
in physics and chemistry account, though perhaps the contrast is less extreme between
ethical judgments and judgments in the social sciences. Some special account, not
shared by the natural science model, of when to count considered moral judgments
reliable or unreliable is called for.
The considered moral judgments with which we begin constructing a moral theory
(according to the method of wide reflective equilibrium) must be screened for the
presence of factors that can give us reason to believe that they are unreliable. These
factors need not be exactly the same as those that ad'•ersely affect non-moral
observations. If they are not, then revision on the basis of coherence with non-moral
beliefs that do not concern the reliability of moral judgments and correction for
unreliable non-moral observations will be insufficient for justification. Even with
such revisions and corrections, many moral judgments that we may have good reason
to believe are unreliable can be included in the judgments in such a coherent set.
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Distortion of moral judgments seems to be more widespread and systematic than
distortion of non-moral judgments, including linguistic judgments. Perhaps this
should come as no suprise, partly because moral judgments deal with matters that quite
directly affect our interests and our general sense of security. Some moral judgments
concern the distribution of social resources and the general terms of cooperation
between people. In addition, the ability to make certain moral judgments requires
special capacities of imagination and empathy not particularly important for the
ability to make other kinds of judgments, and these capacities may not be highly
valued. The factors that can distort moral judgments are not limited to immediate.
rather transient physical conditions either existing in the environment or in the
person making the judgment. A mere change of locale, lighting, or state of inebriation
or fatigue would not correct for many quite prevalent factors that affect moral
judgments. Creating special laboratory conditions for making these judgments is
impractical and would he ineffective in increasing reliability. Confining judgments to
those made in thought experiments may be insufficient for the removal of biases. Deep
psychological and social factors can distort moral judgments in ways that may be
widespread across populations, and not so immediately open to correction or
recognition by the person holding the beliefs
First (as is the case perhaps less frequently for non-moral judgments), we regularly
dismiss moral judgments that we have some reason to believe are influenced by self-
interest or bias toward a particular group. We also have reason to believe that
circumstances of extreme material deprivation either currently existing or existing in
a person's past can affect the person's judgment about what is good in a way that
justifies discounting these judgments. The ability to imagine and compare worthwhile
activities is greatly hampered when whatever material security required to pursue
them has not been enjoyed in the past or is not currently enjoyed or cannot be
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anticipated in the future. To the extent that these judgments about what is worthwhile
influence moral judgments, we can expect the moral judgments to be distorted.
Likewise, oxtreme emotional deprivation, perhaps especially when it occurs in
childhood, may affect moral judgments, insofar as the ability to make moral judgments
depends upon set;e capacity for empathy. For example, psychoanalyst Alice Miller 14
has proposed that part of the explanation for the participation in or high degree of
tolerance for Nazi cruelties among members of the German population is that utterly
inhumane child-rearing practices severely impaired the capacity for empathy and
increased the tolerance for pain and suffering in this group She discovered that the
advice of child-rearing manuals that prescribed brutal and arbitrary punishments as
the best method for raising well-disciplined children were widely followed in the
childhoods of the generations that came of age soon before and during World War Two.
Also, societal and parental norms for cooperative behavior which have little basis in
moral judgment (rather than, at worst, judgments about what is expedient for those in
power) may nonetheless be tenaciously regarded as morally correct because of a
combination of power imbalances and the need for security.
Aside from special, isolated factors that we might clearly pinpoint as operating in
particular cases, there may be general tendencies that operate to distort moral
judgments more frequently than non-moral judgments. Psychoanalysts have proposed
that we have a deep-seated psychological need to believe that the forms of social
cooperation under which we live are more or less fair or morally justifiable or that, if
they are not, we can effect a change in these forms of cooperation. If we hold neither
belief, our sense of security is threatened, since the content of moral concerns is at
least partly concerned with human welfare, and our well-being is endangered if we
14 drice Miller, f.g rfrurQn ~G.si (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983).
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live under unfair systems of cooperation over which we have no influence. I' we
correctly (as is often the case of a young child) or incorrectly believe ourselves to have
little power to change the terms of (by hypothesis, unfair) cooperation, we may be
unconsciously driven to believe that these practices are fair or morally justified in
order to preserve our sense of security. The tenacity of these judgments may be
evidence that these factors are more pervasive and systematic in the case of moral
judgments than in the case of non-moral judgments.
Instead of starting with all considered moral judgments that we are reasonably
certain are free from the distorting influences that most typically influence non-
moral observational judgments(as the natural science model may seem to suggest), we
need to have more leeway both initially and at the theoretical level to discard moral
judgments that there is some reason to believe are influenced by the factors described
above. Wide pre-theoretical and theoretical latitude for discarding considered
judgments when considered judgments are supposed to provide an important check on
theories may seem to invite question-begging, However, insofar as there is enough
initial agreement on some considered moral judgments as well as some initial
agreement on the grounds for dismissal of moral judgments, we need not assume that
such dismissals will simply serve as attempts to justify favored ethical theories for
which there are no independent grounds. Any claims used to support a particular
theory must themselves be supported by considerations independent of the theory
being tested. Thus, claims about distortion that support a particular ethical theory by
giving reason to discount ethical judgments that conflict with the theory must have
independent support.
The appeal of the analogy to linguistics is that the methods for developing linguistic
theories rely heavily on judgments of speakers about their language and yet there is
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freedom exercised in discarding these judgments on the basis of the presence of factors
that are peculiarly prone to distort linguistic judgment. Speaker intuitions about
grammaticality, ambiguity ?,nd synonymy are regarded as reasonably reliable, but
there is leeway for dismissing certain judgments as products of performance errors,
due to psychological or even social factors such as short-term memory limitations,
heuristic devices for comprehending sentences and class aspirations. These distorting
factors may or may not be beyond the immediate correction or recognition of the
speaker making the judgment. Judgments may be discounted early on in the process of
theory building or only after considerable development in both linguistic and
psychological theory.
Daniels suggests that disagreement in ethical judgments should be regarded as no
more troublesome for the possiblity of objective ethical theories than di"r Qreement in
non-moral judgments is for objective scientific theory. However, giving justified
leeway for more initial (as well as theoretically based) dismissal of considered
judgments in developing ethical theory than there is for dismissing observations and
more theoretical claims that play a comparable role in developing theories in the
natural sciences may help to give a more satisfactory answer to worries about
disagreement and objectivity in ethics. As I discussed earlier, some philosophers take
the considerable disagreement in moral judgments to tell against the possiblity of
objective ethical theories. 15 If there is much more initial disagreement in considered
moral judgments due to distorting factors beyond immediate correction and recognition
than there is on non-moral judgments that serve as evidence for scientific theories,
1t For example, John Mackie, EAi• Inventing Riht ankLd Ira•on (New York: Penguin
Books, 1977) pp. 36-8; Bernard Williams, Fthics ana I LimiuI p9 Philosophy
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1985) pp. 132-155.
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general coherentist answers to doubts based upon wide disagreement in considered
ethical beliefs may seem to have little weight. A general coherentist answer to w-rries
about disagreement is that disagreement will reduce as adjustments for coherence in
overall belief systems are made. But adjustments for coherence made between ethical
principles, judgments and other non-moral particular beliefs and theories that do not
concern the reliability conditions for ethical judgments may not be the best answer a
believer in objective moral theories can offer. These adjustments may not serve to
reduce disagreement or produce convergence in moral belief to anything approaching
the convergence produced in scientific or non-moral belief on the basis of adjustmeats
for coherence.
David Brink16 argues that it is incumbent upon a moral realist to claim that most
moral disputes are resolvable at least in principle. I take it that on a coherentist
picture, resolving a dispute involves both parties agreeing to a moral belief as the
result of one or both of them adjusting their respective systems of belief to achieve
greater coherence. As Rawls mentions in the passage I cited at the beginning, we are
more likely to abandon a particular ethical judgment which does not cohere well with
an ethical principle (or vice versa) if we have some reason to believe that the ethical
judgment (or the ethical principle) is a product of distorting factors. Ethical
disagreement is much more widespread than non-ethical disagreement and it is
plausible to attribute much of this to distortions in judgment that are particularly
likely to affect moral, rather than non-moral judgment. Perhaps it is alnay. in
principle possible that both parties to a moral dispute will come to agree on a moral
belief on the basis of adjustments for coherence in sets of beliefs that do not include
beliefs about distortion, but resolution of ethical disputes traceable to distortion is much
16 Brink, p. 200.
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more likely to occur if the disputants have some reason to believe that one of thb,
ethical beliefs in question is a product of distortion. We are more likely to have re&sons
to believe that particular moral beliefs are distorted when we have some beliefs about
how moral beliefs in particular can be distorted. Thus, many moral disputes are more
likely to be resolved if beliefs about how moral beliefs are distorted are included in the
set of beliefs with which ibe moral beliefs must cohere than if they are not. And if
moral beliefs r•re prone to special types of distortion and if the distortion is more
widespread, then beliefs about this should appear in coherentist accounts of moral
justification even if they do not in coherentist accounts of non-moral justification
This of course does aot imply that the account of methods and justification for Qthical
theories should not be a coherentist one - our considered moral judgments simply must
cohere with, among other beliefs. our beliefs about the factors that distort these
judgments One result of this is that, the more discarding of initial judgments that can
be justified on this basis, e heavier a burden of proof will be placed upon accounts of
how our judgmen;s come to be distorted Also, a substantial amount of support for an
ethical theor ' may come from psychological or social theories that can explain
distortions in moral judgments.
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Conclusion
Dai tels uses the analogy between methods in ethics and science and argues that
there is a disanalogy between methods in ethics and linguistics for two main reasons.
Neithe: of them count as persuasive grounds for abandoning the linguistic analogy.
First. he invokes the similarity in appeal to "background theories" in order to suggest a
solution for any ethical theory constrained by actual moral judgments: we know that
moral judgments can be unreliable because of such factors as class bias, self-interest or
historical accident. Daniels believes that appeal to background theories gives room for
revisability of moral judgments, so that we have some chance to avoid the danger of
taking unreliable moral judgments as "fixed points" for ethical theories. He believes
that a linguistic analogy suggests that there is either no appeal or limited appeal to
background theories and so there is inadequate pressure for revision of moral
judgments Second, Daniels hopes that the analogy to science, in invoking constraints
to cohere with background theories, will lend credence to the view that an account of
objectivity in ethics parallel to the account of objectivity in scien ce provided by
scientific realism will be forthcoming. These coherence constraints may produce
convergence, and we may be justified in regarding this :onvergence as evidence of
truth. This account awaits treatment of a problem about reliability of moral judgments
other than the one described above. That is, this account of ethics assumes tne burden
of prcviding an account of the reliability of moral judgments even without the
presumption that they are likely to be biased which would perform the same
justificatory task that it is assumed causal reliability stories about observations perform
for science. Notice for the latter we do not need to assume that there is some reason to
believe that observation reports are likely to be biased.
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The sort of appeal to background theories that Daniels invokes does indeed appear to
exert pressure for revision of moral judgments in a way that is foreign to the linguistic
model In particular, there does not seem to be a linguistic analogue to a moral
background theory which would be based upon certain linguistic intuitions and would
constrain acceptance of our judgments of grammaticality. Nevertheless, the linguistic
model does leave room for correction of moral judgments biased by self-interest, class
bias or other factors. Something analogous to a competence-performance distinction
can be invoked On the basis of explicit judgments about distortion, we can pre-
theoretically screen out those judgments that are obviously tinged with self-interest or
class bias Also. we can make the more tenuous decisions about excluding judgments
that require a more sophisticated (i.e , theoretical) understanding of exactly what
constitutes class bias or self-interest in a way that conflicts with moral judgment In
linguistics, the competence-performance distinction can be invoked in either an
intuitive or a highly theoretical way to exclude judgments about grammaticality The
linguistic model suggests that there can be both theory-based and pre-theoretical
grounds for discarding judgments which would remedy the need for assurances of
credibility that come from the specific worries about class bias or self-interest
Also. Daniels' second reason for pressing an analogy between ethics and science is
not ill-served by the linguistic model. First, the linguistic model suggests that, even if
causal reliability stories for moral judgments must be provided, we need not assume
that the causal reliability stories for observations are the only kind suitable for
granting justification to primary evidence That is, we need not assume that we must
either find some sort of perceptual apparatus for sensing moral properties or give up
any claim to be justified in taking our moral judgments as evidence for moral theories
Second, the prospects for achieving convergence by utilizing at least some of the
coherence constraints operative in the scientific case may hold equally well on the
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linguistic model as it does on the scientific model. It is important to note first that
coherence constraints do operate in linguistics. Insofar as the notion of a performance
error can be justified theoretically or can be invoked at a theoretical level, it leaves
open the possibility that our conception of what counts as a distorting influence can
undergo refinement or modification as the theory progresses. Our notion of a moral
performance error may also change as we come to know more about human psychology
and social behavior. Thus, coherence with developments in ethical and non-ethical
theory can count toward justification on the linguistic model
Moreover, the coherence constraints that have the most direct bearing on claims
about distortion may be more important in achieving convergence in ethics than they
are in science This is important, since some people point to the relative lack of
convergence in moral versus scientific inquiry as some evidence against the claim that
there is any objective moral truth to be discovered i take Daniels' general response to
this claim about objectivity to be that there has r -t been sufficient appreciation of the
role that theoretical development plays in the production of convergence in scientific
inquiry that can serve as evidence of truth, and in moral inquiry, there has not been
the irequisite theoretical development which parallels theoretical development in
science. I agree that theoretical development is crucial for producing convergence
which is evidence of truth, but there may be some features of this theoretical
development that are more important in the ethical case than in the scientific case A
plausible explanation fo.: the greater degree of and persistence of disagreemert in
ethics as opposed to science is that. given the content of moral judgments, there is
likely to be much more distortion in these judgments It is true that that a distorted
ethical belief may be abandoned simply on the basis of its inconsistency with another
ethical belief, without any recourse to specific claims about distortion. Developments
in theory of the kind that Daniels proposes may make this a more common occurrence
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Seeing how the justification of a particular considered moral judgment may depend
upon a different moral judgment that supports a background moral theory with
implications about, for example, publicity, may cause us to revise a moral belief (even
one whose origin is traceable to distortion) which we would not have revised had we
been ignorant of the bearing of the publicity condition on a particular moral belief
However, another option in being presented with inconsistent moral beliefs is to hang
onto the original ( by hypothesis, distorted) belief and to make other adjustments in
the entire set of moral beliefs, perhaps by rejecting the moral belief supporting the
background theories. This is a much less reasonable option in the face of good grounds
for believing that the original belief was, for example, influenced by factors known to
make such beliefs unreliable If it is plausible to suppose that distortion is more likely
to occur in ethics than in science, theoretical developments directly concerning the
distortion of judgments may be more important in producing convergence than
theoretical developments that simply reveal the complexity of justification of moral
judgments This is not to claim that theoretict develcrment of the sort Daniels is
interested in is not important Indeed, development of both moral and non-Or.ral
theory seems to be important for accounts of distortion Nor is it to claim that focusing
on distortion precludes revealing complexity in the justification of moral judgments
The point is simply that a special feature of moral judgments makes at least one aspect
of the linguistic model (the prominence of appeal to theories about distortion as
justification for revisions in initial linguistic judgments) seem close to (perhaps
appropriate) methods in ethics which are crucial for concerns about objectivity
Daniels briefly considers the merits of an account of wide reflective equilibrium
which differs from his in that coherence with backgound moral theories may play less
of a role in reaching convergence This account proposes a kind of pre-theoretical
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screening against bias by finding initial consensus on judgments. He adnmuts that such
an account may help with the problem of credibility of ethical judgments;
Suppose we begin by admitting into the set of initial
considered moral judgments only those judgments on
which there is substantial consensus. There seem to be
two immediate advantages First, ethics looks more like
science in that the initial considered moral judgments
share with observation reports the fact that there is
substantial initial agreement on them The starting point
is more "objective", at least in the sense of intersubjective
agreement One may gain a slight edge in respect to the
problem of initial credibility discussed eas lier
(revisability is, nevertheless presumed). Second, the
approach makes the wide equilibrium that emerges (if
one does) much more a collective or social product from
the start than does my approach, which is a quite
unnatural idealization in this regard (WRE, p. 281)
However. Daniels objects to this proposal on several grounds. First, he reiterates his
complaint against Brandt that we shouldn't assume that considered judgment ought to
function like observation reports in science, contrary to what this proposal seems to
suggest. But his previously offered argument seems at best to suggest that we shouldn't
expect reliability stories for attributions of complex properties to resemble reliability
stories for the attribution of simple properties characteristic of observation reports.
which perhaps invoke sensory apparatuses for detecting the properties. We could
grant the differences he points out and yet believe that both can serve as the initial
starting points on which we agree in building a theory.
A second objection to this proposal rests upon his contention that the consideration
of alternative principles and the sets of background theories with which they must
cohere will work to eliminate those divergent judgments that should be eliminated He
argues that dispensing with this process of coherence as a corrective makes the
judgments arrived at seem to be merely "methodologically w arranted starting points"
Given the plausibility of the claim that moral judgments are highly susceptible to bias,
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this proposal need not be merely methodologically warranted but rather based upon
some understanding of ethica and human psychology. As I argued earlier, Daniels'
reliance on consideration of alternative principles and their coherence with
background moral theories may not be most effective in producing convergence if the
original disagreement is traceable to distortion. Moreover, the account under
consideration does not entirely rule out revision on the basis if coherence with
background (moral) theories
A third objection to which he attaches less importance is that the method of wide
reflective equilibrium was supposed to be a model for a process of moral argument
when there is disagreement But this need not be ruled out by the proposal to begin by
building a theory on the judgments on which we s kagree. If beginning with what we
agree to produces a theory coherent with other theories which dictates that some
judgments about which there is disagreement be dropped, this seems to represent a
plausible model for resolving ethical disputes
The linguistics modes suggests that much of what we might take as primary evidence
for moral theory can and will be eliminated on the grounds of distortion Assuming
that moral judgments are more liable to distortion than non-moral judgments, this
scems to be a welcome feature of the model If, as I have suggested, the prominent role
of acceptable claims about distortion helps to produce more convergence in moral
judgment than there would be otherwise, the linguistic model may serve claims about
objectivity in ethics well. Of course, just as the scientific model may not be completely
appropriate because of. for example. less liability to distortion and the availability of
well-worked out causal reliability accounts of observation reports, so the linguistic
model has its shortcomings As I remarked earlier, if background moral theories do
farce revisions in the way Daniels suggests, there seems to be no analogue to this in a
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theory of grammar. Also. in advance of detailed development of linguistic and moral
theory, we have much more reason to believe that speakers' judgments about their
language are credible than we have to believe that people's moral judgments are
credible A speaker of a language is highly unlikely to be completely mistaken in
recognizing what counts as part of her language and still manage to be a speaker of the
language. There don't seem to be any analogous limits to the possibility of moral error
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Paper Three: Bernard Williams on the Linguistic Analogy
Introduction
In Ethis.a sa the Limi1 of Philosophy. I Iernard Williams argues thst ethical
theories cannot provide answers to questions about how one should live, and that this is
a good reason to abandon attempts to develop ethical theories. In the course of his
argument, he rejects the suggestion that methods in Iknguistics can provide a model for
the development of ethical theories. He rejects the linguistic model on basically two
grounds. First. he believes that it is implausible to suppose that we could discover a set
of internalized rules that could by itself account for all applications of all ethical terms.
Second, he maintains that linguistics cannot offer a model for the resolution of eth ical
conflicts, which he takes to be an important feature of ethical theories, because he
thinks that ethical theories can provide no compelling reason to abandon those pre-
theoretical intuitions with which they conflict
In section I of this paper. I argue that his first objection simply assumes that the
analogy between linguistic theory and ethical theory must imply that ethical theories
are psychological theories about what rules people have internalized about the
application of ethical terms, and that therte is no need to assume this. His second
objection simply presupposes that we do not have reason to believe that ethical theories
can be true and thus interest in discovering ethical truths cannot motivate u: to ai0pt
theories that have consequences with which our pre-theoretical beliefs conflict.
1 Bernard Williams, Ethics ad mai Is L L Philosonhv (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1985) All page references to this book will be given parenthetically
in the text.
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Though he earlier provides arguments against some specific attempts at providing
objective foundations for ethics (which I will not discuss), it is only in a later
discussion of the distinction between ethics and science that he provides general, in
principle arguments for the position that there are no objective ethical theories
In section 2. 1 discuss Williams' claims against objective ethical theory. First, I
argue that Williams himself is in no position to claim that objective ethical theories are
impossible. because he grants that objective non-theoretical ethical knowledge is
possible and he gives no reason to believe that such knowledge cannot be extended to
theoretical knowledge Second, I maintain that his position relies upon questionable
views both about an epistemological requirement that theories must meet in order to be
justified and about ethical theories' inability to meet the requirement
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I. Williams on Linguistic Theory and Ethical Theory
This section primarily discusses Williams' views on the relev-ace of linguistic theory
to ethics in defending ethical theory. It is divided into four subsections. In la I discuss
some idiosyncrasie- in Williams' definition of an ethical theory and suggest that these
idiosyncrasies introduc' a bias into his arguments against ethical theories. lb is
devoted to Williams' interpretation of what the point of the analogy between ethics and
linguistics is and what implications it has about what an ethical theory is about. I
argue that his interpretation is not the only or even the most natural interpretation of
the analogy. In Ic, I discuss Williams' contention that ethical theory and linguistic
theory must handle the problem of conflicting intuitions differently. Williams'
dicussion suggests that this difference shows that there is an important difference
between the two kinds of theories in what can count as a compelling reason for
accepting a theory. I argue that there are fewer differences in handling conflicting
intuitions than Williams alleges, and even to the extent that there are differences, they
do not have the import for the justification of ethical theory that Williams claims.
la. Preliminaries: A Special Definition of Ethical Theory
Williams offers a general characterization of what an ethical theory is and brief
descriptions of two major styles of ethical theory put forward by philosophers:
An ethical theory is a theoretical account of what ethical
thought and practice are, which account either implies a
general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs
and principles or else implies that there cannot be such a
test (p.i72)
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Citing a formulation offered by T. M. Scanlon, 2  he describes a contractual style
of ethical theory as one which states that:
An act is wrong if its performance under the
circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules
for the general regulation of behavior which no one
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced
general agreement. (p 75).
A utilitarian style of ethical theory, on the other hand, claims that rightness or
wrongness is determiane'J by the welfare of individuals affected by the acts, rules
institutions or practices beitg assessed Thus, "facts of individual welfare" constitute
the "basic subject matter" of othics according 'o utilitarian theories. (p. 75).
W illiams' definition of an ethical theory is somewhat idiosyncratic, and so some
preliminary remarks about the definition and its effect on subsequent arguments are
in order. Two points about his definition are espcially important to note: first, the
definition stipulates that ethical theories must themselves include what have
traditionally been considered meta-ethical claims, and second, his reasons for
excluding his own position as an ethical theory could count as reasons for excluding a
wide range of possible theories which bear little resemblence to his own.
Ethical theories are commonly thought of as general principles describing or
determining what is right or wrong. This usage is perhaps included in Williams'
definition by his specification that part of what he later calls a "positive" othical
theory is "a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs". If general
2 T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism", in Amartya Sen and Bernard
Williams, eds., Utilitarianism a•d Beond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), p. I10.
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principles describing what is right or wrong, together with reasonably
uncontroversial empirical claims, imply ethical claims that either match or contradict
basic ethical beliefs, then ethical theories as they are commonly understood might be
taken to be tests for basic ethical beliefs, or at least they may be taken to be usable as
tests in principle. However, Williams' inclusion of "a theoretical account of what
ethical thought and practice are" as a necessary part of any ethical theory goes far
beyond the common understanding of what an ethical theory is. It seems to require
that what are usually considered meta-ethical claims (about, for example, what
distinguishes ethical from non-ethical judgments, and the relations between ethical
thought and practice) be part of an ethical theory.
Using Williams' definition in an argument for dispensing with ethical theory
introduces a particular understanding of what the burdens of an argument against
ethical theory are which tends to make the defense of ethical theories more difficult
and arguments against ethical theories easier. Principles simply explaining what
counts as right and wrong can be automatically ruled out as ethical theories because
they themselves do not contain what are usually considered to be meta-ethical claims
The more important question about the bearing of meta-ethical claims on the
defensibility of an ethical theory really is whether or not any plausible meta-ethical
claims could support or perhaps even more weakly be consistent with the proposed
principles, not whether or not the theory contains these claims Williams' modification
of the usual understanding of an ethical theory has the effect of placing a burden on
the defender or proponent of an ethicai theory to supply the meta-ethical claims that
support normative principles, rather than placing the burden on the opponent of the
principles to show sthat they cannot be supported by plausible meta-ethical claims
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Understanding the burdens of argument in this manner allows Williams to dismiss the
linguistic analogy as a model for the justification of ethical theories without
considering how moral realism can support the legitimacy of appeal to this model. I
discuss the bearing of the meta-ethical claim that ethical theories can be true on the
plausibility of Williams' attack on the linguistic analogy in section Ic.
A second point about Williams' definition of an ethical theory also has some bearing
on how questionable or idiosyncratic his grounds for dismissing candidate ethical
theories are Despite the fact that Williams himself provides arguments against the
usefulness of very general ethical theories, he does not classify his own position as
among those included in his definition and later described as "nec :tive ethical
theories" Negative ethical theories are " theoretical accounts of what ethical thought
and practice are" (which imply that there is no) "general test for the correctness of
basic ethical beliefs and principles" (p. 74). His main reason for not classifying his
own position as a negative ethical theory is that he believes that an important feature
of either a positive or negative ethical theory is that it is the theoretical account of
what ethical thought and practice are that determines whether or not there is a
general test, whereas his view is that philosophy cannot determine hov or whether we
"can think in ethics" (p.74). Presumably then philosophy itse!f provides the
theoretical account which either implies the test or implies that there cannot be one
This seems to suggest that philosophy cannot draw upon. for example, psychology.
sociology or history in giving a theoretical account if ethical thought and practice. If
so, Williams gives ethical theorist .xceedingly restricted resources, and it should come
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as little surprise if no adequate ethical theory could be developed under such
limitations
Arguments against ethical theories are uninteresting if they simply consist of
dismissals of the theories on the grounds that they do not count as ethical theories
according to an unusual definition which does not have some overriding, independent
appeal Though at least one philosopher 3 does think that Williams' definition has
special merit, both in challenging the distinction between normative ethics and meta-
ethics and in focusing our attention on the philosophical reasons why moral
philosophers have advocated certain normative principles. I do not think that these
features compensate for the difficulties introduced by using this definition
3 Susan Wolf, "The Deflation of Moral Philosophy", .hic 97 (1987), pp 821-833.
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lb Williams' Construal of the Analogy Between Ethics and Linguistics
Williams believes that ethical theories as they are "naturally understood" take
certain ethical beliefs as their starting points (p 93) These ethical beliefs are
sometimes called "intuitions", where the term"intuition" is understood to refer to a
perhaps somewhat reflective, but nevertheless pre-theoretical judgment This class of
judgments may or may not be limited to judgments offered as a response 'o an ethical
question about a hypothetical situation in a thought experiment "Williams notes that
this particular use of the term "intuitions" is prompted by an analogy with linguistics
(p 95) Certain speaker beliefs about language that serve as evidence for linguistic
theories are called "intuitions" Typically, these beliefs are judgments (often elicited
by the questions of linguists) about the grammaticality, synonymity or ambiguity of
sentences I illiams argues that the linguistic conception of an intuition has little
application to ethics I take it that the significance for Williams of distinguishing
linguistic and ethical judgments is the bearing of that distinction on the question of
whether or not the prospects for developing a justified ethical theory (as it is naturally
understood) are as good as those for developing a linguistic theory
Williams first concedes that the linguistic conception of an intuition is indisputably
relevant to ethics, because he thinks that some ethical intuitions are "merely
applications" of the linguistic conception of an intuition. (p 95) He elaborates on this
claim by saying that certain ethical terms (for virtues and kinds of actions) are
general terms in the language, and there is "room for linguistic intuitions about the
situations they apply to.. [because the terms havel complex conditions of application "
(p 95) I take it that if this is so, the ethical judgment that, for example, quarantining
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is e cruel practice, in some way involves an application of the linguistic judgment that
the term "cruel" designates the property of indifference to suffering There seems to
be a difference between claiming that ethical intuitions are "merely applications" of
linguistic intuitions and the claim that there is "room for" linguistic intuitions about
when ethical terms apply to situations The first claim suggests that ethical judgments
about people or kinds of actions are linguistic judgments about what ccrtain terms
designate Contrary to what Williams says, this is is far from indisputable and he does
not arg'ie for it A linguistic judgment about what a certain term designates is a
judgment about that term's meaning, whereas an ethical judgment about a person is a
judgment about, for example, some characteristic of that person, such as his fairness A
term might have meaning, but it could never be fair The second claim might
reasonably be understood as the claim that, in order to make certain ethical judgments,
we must have certain beliefs about the meanings of the terms used in the judgments
This second, trivial claim is not a special claim about the relevance of linguistics to
ethics, since it could equally well be made about non-ethical judgments
Whatever the merits of the suggestion that ethical intuitions are "merely
applications" of linguistic intuitions, the conception of a linguistic intuition can be
relevant to ethics in a different way In both linguistics and ethics, moderately
reflective, pretheoretical judgments form an important basis for theory The
conception of a linguistic intuition is relevant to ethics since it counts as an example of
an acceptable use of moderately reflective, pre-theoretical judgments as a basis for
theory. As Williams' discussion progresses, he considers and dismisses one construal of
the claim that both linguistics and ethics can use pre-theoretical judgments as a basis
for theory He considers the position that a hopeful analogy between ethics and
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linguistics might be drawn by speculating that there might be similar explanations for
what look like similarities between linguistic capabilities and the capacity to make
ethical judgments Because a speaker can unhesitatingly recognize as correct in his or
her language sentences he or she has never heard before, we have good reason to
believe that it is possible to form a theory of natural language which gives an account
of the rules internalized by the speaker Williams dismisses the suggestion that this
could serve as a model for explaining our ability to answer questions about the right
thing to do in situations we have never encountered belore in keeping with the
linguistic model. he supposes that the proposed analogous explanation of our ability to
answer questions about what is ethically right is a set of internalized, discursively
stateable rules He objects to this proposal that we do not need to suppose or should not
necessarily expect to find a clear, discursive, internalized rule underlying our abilities
to make these ethical judgments (pp. 97-98) I think that Williams' understanding of
the analogy is mistaken, but his objection needn't undermine the analogy between
linguistics and ethics even as he understands it What we need to suppose or
necessarily expect to find doesn't give us the grounds for believing that a set of
internalized, discursively stateable rules at least in part explains our linguistic
capacities either Whether or not it actually is an explanation can only be determined
by the success of the project of constructing such theories of natural languages that do
account for our ability to use languages
Williams construes the analogy to linguistics as one which is intended to point out a
parallel between (or even an identification of) an explanation of our capacity to use
language and an explanation of our capacity to make moral judgments This is
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understandable, given Rawls' characterization of how methods in ethics and linguistics
can be compared,
Now one may think of moral philosophy at first..as the attempt to
describe our moral capacity ... conception of justice captures our
moral sensibility when the everyday judgments we do make are
in accordance with its principles...a useful comparison here is
with the problem of detscribing the sense of grammaticalness that
we have for the sentences of our native language. In this case
the aim is to characterize the ability to recognize well-formed
sentences by formulating clearly-expressed principles which
make the same discriminations as the native speaker. 4
However, it isn't clear that an analogy with linguistics must be meant to imply that
the basic concern of an ethical theory is to explain our capacity to adjudge acts never
encountered before as "right" or "wrong". An ethical theory may obey the constraint
that it consist of a set of rules which would generate answers to the questions about
whether or not an act is right which are more or less consistent with the intuitions
offered by people The claim might be that it is analogous to a linguistic theory to this
extent without invoking the further claim that it is the set of ethical rules internalized
by people with the capacity to answer these questions
We may construe the analogy other than how Williams construes it for two separate
reasons. First, we could accept Williams' characterization of linguistic theory and the
role of linguistic intuitions in the development of linguistic theory but deny that the
analogy has the import for ethical theory that Williams supposes. We might be
interested in the question of whether or not there could be a set of principles which
could generate an enormously complex and varied set of ethical judgments, because
such a set of principles could (if the judgments were correct) serve as the general test
, John Rawls, A Theory 1J1ustice (Cambridge. MA. Harvard University Press, 1971) pp
46-47,
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for basic ethical beliefs that Williams says a positive theory implies Linguistics may
serve as a model since it develops very abstract and general principles capable of
generating sentences consonant with speakers' grammaticality judg ments If no set of
principles could do this much for people's moral judgments, this would be one reason to
believe that no general test for ethical beliefs is possible, and Williams' doubts about a
positive ethical theory might be vindicated If the model of linguistics gives us a
reason to believe that there could be such a set of principles, we might th(:n go ahead to
develop an account of how the particular set of principles is justified The justification
of principles may merely rest on the match of their consequences with considered
moral judgments or their explanatory power, but the linguistic analogy need not
commit us to the view that ethical theories are explanations of moral capacities as
internalized rules
A second possibility is that we could reject his understanding of what a linguistic
theory is or why accommodating linguistic intuitions should be considered part of the
justification of a linguistic theory For example, a philosophical conception of
linguistics like the one espoused by Jerrold Katz5 does not take linguistics to be a study
of the set of rules internalized by people with the capacity to use language On his
view, theories in linguistics are about abstract objects, even though some of the
evidence for these theories comes from speakers' intuitions about their languages We
should not consider linguistic theories to be about the set of rules internalized by
speakers any more than we consider mathematical theories to be theories of rules
internalized by mathematicians Thus the analogy between tinguistics and ethics
3Jerrold Katz. Lanuae and Qthh Abstract Qiects (Totowa. N J.: Rowman and Littlfield
1981).
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would not suggest that an ethical theory is a psychological explanation of our ability to
make ethical judgments
More generally, the fact that we do have intuitions or we do make judgments of a
certain kind in a way that cannot be explained simply by explicitly being taught these
beliefs does constitute some evidence that we have a relatively complex, internalized
capacity which enables us to make these judgments. The capacity may be either a
capacity which specifically enables us to make judgments of this kind or a capacity we
utilize in making many different types of judgments But in either case, this capacity
may be a capacity that enables us to make true judgments It is reasonable to suppose
that scientific judgments made by scientists are evidence that the scientists who make
the judgments possess a complex, internalized capacity rather than simply that they
have been explicitly taught particular scientific beliefs which they reiterate when
appropriate However, these judgments are not merely evidence that the scientists
have internalized capacities to make scientific judgments They are also often evidence
for the truth of scientific theories about, for example, the chemical properties of
liquids In these cases, we have reason to believ\e that the scientist's judgments are
true, and so they constitute evidence for a scientific theory that purports to explain
these truths Whether or not we accept Katz' position, the linguistic model can be taken
merely to suggest that an important part of the justification of a theory can be how
well it accommodates ordinary, pre-theoretical judgments, rather than to suggest that
theories that consist of rulos can themselves be psychological explanations of intuitive
judgments Speakers can make some reliable judgments about their languages, and on
these grounds theories about language should be consistent with these judgments. If it
is possible to make some reasonably reliable pre-theoretical ethical judgments, then, as
106
in the case of linguistic theory, an important part of the justification of an ethical
theory is how well it accommodates ordinary, pre-theoretical judgments The ethical
theory need noL itself be a psycholo 'cal account of how people come to have these
intuitions On this understanding of the linguistic analogy, the intuitive judgments
simply provide a reasonably reliable guide to. for example, what is in fact ethically
right or wrong, which is what the theory is attempting to explain The explanation for
why ethical intuitions should prove reasonably reliable need not be the same as that
for linguistic intuition, nor need it give us a reason to believe that ethical intuitions
are as reliable as linguistic intuitions For example, under special circumstances, we
may be good at recognizing when the interests of everyone affected by an action are
taken into account because our need for stable forms of social cooperation makes
accurate recognition an important capacity for thriving
Williams' construal of the linguistics analogy as suggesting that an ethical theory is a
psychological theory may in part stem from his interpretation of how an intuition can
serve as evidence for a linguistic theory At one point he claims that "intuition" refers
to "a speaker's spontaneous grasp of what can be said in his language" and thus
competent speakers have intuitions about what can or cannot be said correctly in their
languages It is for this reason that intuitions are "the raw material for a theory of a
natural language" (p 95) This may suggest that we should understand "intuitions" in
this context as "intuitings" - events that demonstrate a speaker's grasp of the language,
rather than as "intuiteds" - facts about grammaticality, synonymy. etc, whose source
happens to be speaker intuitions Accordingly, theories explaining these intuitions
will be theories explaining a speaker's grasp of a language rather than a theory
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explaining what sequences are grammatical, ambiguous or synonymous Williams may
assume that linguistic intuitions and by implication ethical intuitions constitute
evidence for a theory only if the theory purports to be an explanation of the
occurrence of the intuitions, rather than an explanation of what is intuited (eg , what
is right or what is grammatical). Since intuiting is psychological, it is plausible to
suppose that theories whose tasks are primarily to explain occui rences of intuitions
are psychological theories If, on the other hand, the theory must explain what is
intuit•• as right or grammatical, there is no presumption in favor of the view that the
then -y is a psychologicai theory Williams is not alone in this interpretation of
linguistic intuition and linguistic theory As we have seen in Paper One, Jerry Fodor
appears to rely on this interpretation of linguistic intuition to argue for his views
about linguistic theory In Paper Two, I suggested that this interpretation of linguistic
intuitions influences Norman Daniels' position that linguistics provides an inadequate
model for the justification of ethical theories Neither Williams nor Fodor nor Daniels
offer any argument to the effect that this interpretation is necessary or preferable to
the alternative I suggest
The non-psychological interpretation of the linguistic analogy draws attention to an
important point about how much or how little ground Williams gains in his arguments
against ethical theory by his criticism of the linguistics analogy Williams' position
against the view that an internalized set of stateable principles could explain our
ability to make moral judgments does not itself count as a position against the view that
a set of stateable principles could explain our true moral judgments Our ability to make
the judgments may not be best explained by an internalized set of principles, but the
facts expressed in our judgments could still be best explained by a set of principles A
a %F #
set of internalized principles may not be the best explanation of our ability to make, for
example, observational judgments about the behavior of gases, but the facts expressed
in our observational judgments could still be best explained by a set of principles of
chemistry Someone still might object to the linguistic analogy as I have construed it
that no set of principles could capture all of our true moral judgments because there is
no general underlying pattern to them, but this is not Williams' objection tox the
analogy
Ic The Problem of Conflicting Intuitions
Williams also questions the analogy between ethics and linguistics on the grounds
that the resolution of conflicts in ethical intuitions should be sharply distinguished
from the resolution of conflicts in linguistic intuitions He claims that, whereas ethical
theories are required to resolve conflicts between ethical intuitions of different people,
there is no such requirement for linguistic theories (p 98) But he immediately goes
on to catalogue various theoretical moves for dealing with conflicts in linguistic
intuitions, we attribute different dialects to the people with conflicting intuitions, and
linguistic theory can discount a particular judgment of grammaticality as "not really" a
linguistic intuition so much as a product of a performance error He comments that it
is "certainly appropriate for a theory, having formed a principle on the strength of
some intuitions, to discount other and conflicting intuitions" (p 98).
On the basis of Williams' own description of the theoretical devices used in linguistics
to deal with confli:ting intuitions, it is too hasty to conclude at this point that
linguistics can provide no model for the resolution of conflicting intuitions in ethics
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A dialect model for dealing with conflict in effect would provide no grounds for
claiming that one of a set of conflicting ethical beliefs is trut and the other is false, and
so no grounds for choosing between the two 'Though this may be an unacceptable
proposal for &a conflicting ethical beliefs, an acceptable ethical theory could fail to
provide any reason to choose between certain conflicting ethical beliefs If, for
example, adherence to either of two alternative incompatible sets of moral norms
produced the same amount of human welfare, and a given ethical theory implies that
moral norms are to be evaluated by the amount of welfare produced by adherence to
the norms, then the theory would provide no grounds for choosing between certain
conflicting ethical beliefs based upon alternative norms
Moreover, discounting particular linguistic intuitions as, for example, products of'
performance errors, may not leave us without grounds to choose between certain
conflicting linguistic beliefs It remains to be seen whether or not the notion of a
performance error could be useful as a suggestion for how some conflicting ethical
intuitions might be dealt with
After acknowledging that there are "theoretical devices" for dealing with conflicts
in linguistic intuitions. Williams says
It is not like this with ethical intuitions A lot turns on
what outlook is to be adopted, and an ethically
idiosyncratic outlook will not simply be left alone,
inasmuch as it touches on any matter of importance or on
the interests of others. Here the aim of theory is not
simply, or even primarily, to understand conflict We
have other ways. historical and sociological, of
understanding it The aim of theory is rather to resolve it,
in the more radical sense that it should give some
compelling reason to accept one intuition rather than
another. (p. 99)
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We can grant that the resolution of ethical conflicts matters more than the resolution
of conflicts in linguistic intuitions It is unlikely that bloodshed would ever result from
conflicts in linguistic intuitions The fact of the more pressing need in the one case
does not in itself dictate a significant difference between the two enterprises in what
counts as a legitimate dismissal of some intuitions, however. Williams implies that
while linguistic theory may give us a means for understanding conflict in linguistic
intuitions, it doesn't give a "compelling reason" to accept one intuition rather than
another, which is what is required of an ethical theory
Williams doesn't explain the notion of a "compelling reason" here, and later I will go
on to discuss some possible interpretations of his use of the notion in this context
However, it does seem as though there must be compelling reasons or special
justifications for the acceptance of a linguistic theory which discounts certain
intuitions of grammaticality offered by native speakers. If there are, then the
implication about this difference between ethics and linguistics seems to be ftlse. Such
special justifications can be found when a linguist provides a persuasive argument that
certain intuitions discounted by a proposed theory should be understood as
performance errors. For example, some speakers find the following sentence
unacceptable
I called the man who wrote the book that you told me about up 6
6 Noam Chomsky, Asec of ts Theory of Sn (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1965), p.
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An explanation of this may involve citing other, partly non-!inguistic theories about
memory limitations to account for treating these alleged linguistic intuitions as
performance errors. The citation of this factor, combined with the general
persuasiveness of the theory itself (for example, its ability to account for most of the
data when combined with theories about performance) will give more or less
compelling reasons for those at least in the field of linguistics to accept some intuitions
and not others as reliable intuitions
We might speculate then that the analogy between ethics and linguistics could be
extended to include considerations of how rejection of some intuitions can be justified.
Sociological, psychological or historical theories might be drawn upon to understand
how some conflicting ethical intuitions come to be believed. Such understanding may
in some instances involve grounds for dismissing these as reliable ethical beliefs,
according to a particular ethical theory The acceptability of such a dismissal would
rest upon both the acceptability of the ethical theory in question as well as any other
theories brought to bear upon understanding the intuitions in question Thus, in both
cases, compelling reasons for the rejection of particular intuitions may come in part
from consideration of a theory outside of linguistic theory or ethical theory itself This
suggestion is explicitly endorsed by Rawls in a quotation I cited in the last chapter. In
discussing the analogy between ethics and linguistics. Rawls claims that someone is
most likely to revise pre-theoretical judgments to conform to principles of justice "if he
can find an explanation for the deviation which undermines his confidence in his
original judgments"'.7
7 John Rawls, AbTheorYQ elIutic (Cambridge, MA.' Harvard University Press, 1971), p
48
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As an example of the foregoing, suppose that an ethical theory that manages to
capture a vast array of ethical intuitions has as a consequence or component principle
that physical violence or coercion is morally impermissible except in cases of self-
defense. Suppose further that some people, while sharing most of the intuitions
captured by the theory, believe that physical punishment is morally acceptable as a
means of disciplining children. A possible psychological explanation for this belief is
that it is maintained as a safeguard against painful guilt feelings which can easily arise
in certain child-rearing situations, If a child is uncooperative in a close, daily living
situation, this might arouse great hostility in a parent which is more diffic;ult to control
than hostility toward others who are uncooperative. The greater difficulty may be
attributable to the fact that a child's dependency on a parent makes serious retaliation
less likely than retaliation from others who are not so dependent, and so one factor
normally operating to help control expression of hostility is diminished in these
situations Physical punishment may serve as an outlet for this hostility, and a belief
in the moral justifiability of this practice helps to ease any guilt feelin gs. If this
psychological explanation were accepted, and both the theory and people's moral
beliefs generally cannot countenance the difficulty of adhering to a standard of non-
violence in situations where the recipient of the violence is dependent as an excusing
condition (as opposed to, for example, situations of self-defense), the psychological
explanation and the ethical theory combined may give a compelling reason to reject
the intuition that physical punishment of children is morally permissible
Williams seems to be suggesting that ethical theories have some special burdens that
linguistic theories do not have in justifying the rejection of intuitions. Given that
113
Williams does net discuss justifications for the rejection of linguistic intuitions at any
length, he does not explicitly argue for the position that these justifications must differ
significantly from justifications for the rejection of ethical intuitions However, there
seem to be two assumptions in his discussion of ethical theories which, if accepted,
could be used to distinguish the kinds of legitimate justification for discarding
linguistic intuitions from anything that could count as a legitimate reason for
discounting ethical intuitions.
The first is Williams' apparent assumption that, in criticizing ethical judgments,
ethical theories must work in isolation from other theories On Williams' account,
ethical theories provide tests for determining right or wrong actions without recourse
to psychological, sociological or historical explanations for ethical judgments Perhaps
Williams assumes that critique based upon ethical theory must be isolated from
psychological, sociological or historical explanation for judgments becaAse he believes
that, typically, ethical theories have not called upon psychological, sociological or
historical explanation in critiques of ethical judgments One context in which he seems
to indicate that he believes that ethical theories do not typically use social scientific
explanation of judgment in the service of critique is when he distinguishes "the most
potent" critiques of existing ethical beliefs and attitudes which are based upon
demonstrations that the attitudes rest upon "myths or falsehoods" about what people are
like from ethical theories (which presumably can function as critiques of existing
beliefs and attitudes) which are more "elaborate, thoroughgoing and ambitious"
structures He says that, in considering the kind of critique of existing ethical attitudes
and beliefs that an ethical theory provides, he is not concerned with critiques of
ethical beliefs that rest upon demonstrations that certain attitudes are based upon
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myths or falsehoods (p 71) Distinguishing thbese two kinds of critiques may encourage
Williams to ignore the possibility that the latter "potent" critiques might be included in
or taken to be support for critiques of ethical beliefs based upon ethical theory
Critiques demonstrating that attitudes rest upon myths or falsehootr may make
eiensive use of psychological, ,ociological or historical theories about, for example,
how psychological or sociological conditions support the maintenance of %..storted
beliefs about different social groups On the "performance error" model of justifiably
dismissing intuitions that conflict with ethical theories, support for a theory which
implies that an alleged ethical intuition is incorrect can come both from the theory's
ability to account for many of our ethical intuitions as well as the existence of
acceptable non-ethical theories that could provide "potent critiques" of the intuitions
the theory dismisses
As an illustration of the difference between a critique of an ethical intuition based
upon an ethical theory alone, and a critique based upon both ethical theory and
psychological or sociological claims that bear upon the reliability of tht intuition,
consider the example of physical punishment of children cited earlier A critique of
the intuition that physical punishment of children is morally permissible which is
based upon ethical theory without reference to the reliability of the intuition may run
something as follows If practices for ensuring cooperation cause more suffering than
alternative practices that can achieve the same goal, then engaging in these practices
is wrong Physical punishment of children causes more suffering to a child than
alternative practices for gaining cooperation, and so physical punishment of children
is wrong On the other hand. a critique of the intuition that punishment of children is
permissible that directly questions the reliability of the intuition may invoke the claim
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that the belief in the permissibility of physical punishment is influenced by
children's dependency on adults. For example, such a critique may claim that this
dependency contributes to blindness to the extent of children's suffering by
encouraging children to hide their suffering and making it easy for adults to ignore it.
Thus. children's dependence on adults can adversely affect adults' ability to take their
interests into account impartially, and the reliability of the intuition is questionable on
these grounds
There is more :extual evidence that Williams assumes that ethical theories cannot call
upon non-ethical theories for support in dismissing particular ethical beliefs that
conflict with ethical theories. In a discussion of objectivity that follows his dismissal
of the linguistic analogy, Williams compares ethical theories with theories in the
natural sciences. (pp. 132-155) He claims that ethical theories compare unfavorably
with theories in the natural sciences, since ethical theories cannot explain how people
might "go wrong" in their ethical beliefs, whereas presumably the natural sciences
can offer us "theories of error". (p 151). But suppose that a defender of a particular
theory in the natural sciences offers a "theory of error" which explains why, for
example, some apparently disconfirming evidence should be construed as mistaken It
is reasonable to expect that, at least in most cases, this explanation will make use of
theories and claims that are not included in the theory being assessed. For example, the
theories may come from psychology, physiology or optics. Such a use of theories
outside the particular theory being assessed is not considered illegitimate. Indeed, the
need to use theories that are not part of the particular theory being assessed is not
confined to explanations of error. It is a commonplace that auxiliary hypotheses are
needed to derive testable consequences from theories These auxiliary hypotheses may
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be justified on the basis of theories in disciplines separate from the theory being
assessed. So direct confirmation of a theory as well as dismissal of potentially
disconfirming evidence may depend on the use of theories from other disciplines If
ethical theories must be assessed in isolation from non-ethical theories, then an ethical
theory could not make use of an explanation for how it came about that a particular
intuition is believed which might give some reason to reject the intuition as ethically
incorrect and so some support for the ethical theory which rejects the intuition. But
the assumption that ethical theories should differ from theories in the natural sciences
(or in linguistics, for that matter) in the legitimacy of using "outside" theories in
explanations of error requires a justification, and Williams does not offer any
A second consideration which might serve to distinguish ethics from linguistics on
the justifiability of a theory's rejection of intuitions is discernible in his discussion of
Rawls' theory of justice as one example of a contractual style of ethical theory In
considering ethical theories with consequences that conflict with everyday ethical
intuitions, Williams twice (pp 92 and 99) asks why we should give such an ethical
theory any authority at all The question of authority clearly is an important question
for Williams to consider, given that the view he argues for in this book is that we have
reason to dispense with ethical theories and presumably we have reason to dispense
with ethical theories if they can have no authority The question of whether or not an
ethical theory has authority may be taken in two ways. it is either a question about
how anyone could be motivated to act in accordance with an ethical theory, or a
question about how anyone could have a reason to accept, in the sense of being
justified in accepting, an ethical theory If no one could have a desire to act in
accordance with an ethical theory, then the theory would have no authority in the
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first sense This would be a serious shortcoming for an ethical theory, given the
assumption that moral considerations do at least sometimes motivate people to act in
accordance with those considerations However, in his discussion of Rawls, Williams
seems to have the second question in mind, since he speaks of "the reasonableness of
aiming at an ethical theory" and giving "a compelling reason to accept one intuition
rather than another" (p 99) I1 take it that, on the second interpretation of the
question, ethical theories have no authority if we are not justified in believing ethical
theories Determining whether or not we are justified in believing ethical theories
involves investigating the justifications offered for ethical theories and assessing their
value If such an investigation led us to conclude that the only remotely plausible
justifications were insufficient to warrant belief in ethical theories, then ethical
theories should not have any authority at all
In the early chapters of his book, Williams argues that attempts to justify ethical
principles "from the outside"- without any recourse to pre-theoretical ethical beliefs or
assumptions - do not succeed. He then turns his attention to ethical theories that do not
attempt justification from outside of ethics, but rather begin with or build upon at
least some pre-theoretical ethical beliefs or :ntuitions. For Williams, the question of the
authority of these ethical theories is why we should give any authority to ethical
theories if they conflict with pre-theoretical ethical bcliefs This suggests that he
thinks that there is some special problem for the justification of ethical theories when
the theories conflict with pre-theoretical ethical beliefs However, the fact that a
problem of justification of belief arises when a theory conflicts with pre-theoretical
beliefs is not something which is peculiar to ethics Ethical theories are not the only
theories that conflict with widely-held beliefs, and indeed Williams acknowledges this
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He explicitly compares aspirations for an ethical theory which is critical of some of our
beliefs to aspirations for scientific theories
The natural understandinb of an ethical theory takes it as a
structure of propositions which, like a scientific theory, in
part provides a framework for our beliefs, in part criticizes
or revises them. So it starts from our beliefs, though it may
revise them. (p. 93).
If a theory advocates revision of pre-theoretical beliefs for which there is some
presumption, then a justification for this revision is in order, whether the theory is
ethical or non-ethical It is surely legitimate to ask this much of an ethical theory,
especially one whose critical aspirations are parallel to the goals of a scientific theory.
However, if more should be required of an ethical theory in the justification of
revisions of beliefs, then it is up to Williams to argue for why this should be so.
In his discussion of Rawls (which I will comment on in some detail), Williams seems
to be assuming that general epistemic considerations cannot be appealed to in
defending an ethical theory's authority to discard the ethical intuitions of some people
I take it that a (questionable) consequence of this assumption is that characteristics we
generally consider to count in favor of a theory do not count in favor of an ethical
theory that contradicts the ethical intuitions of some people. For example, an ethical
theory's comprehensiveness, its coherence with other intuitions and theories or the
fact that the theory that is inconsistent with a particular intuition is part of the
simplest overall account of ethical (and non-ethical) belief cannot count in favor orf a
theory and against a particular intuition (where acceptance of the theory dictates such
a dismissal) One possible explanation for this assumption is that Williams believes that
we could never be motivated to act in accordance with an ethical theory that
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contradicted some of our ethical intuitions If appeal to epistemic considerations could
not play a part in justifying the dismissal of an ethical intuition, then this would
distinguish ethics from linguistics. It doesn't seem as though candidate linguistic
theories cannot appeal to epistemic considerations in rejecting particular linguistic
intuitions For example, sentences or phrases that are extremely long or complicated,
such as those sentences or phrases that have multiply embedded phrases, may be
judged unacceptable by speakers of a language yet counted as grammatical by linguists.
Noam Chomsky offers the following example in Aspects t Ltb TheoryY of SyAlr:
The man who the boy who the students recognized pointed out is a
friend of mine.8
Stephen Stich describes a general rationale for classifying sentences speakers find
unacceptable such as the one above as grammatical:
..,sentences may seem odd because they are simply too
long and complicated. If the grammarian suspects that
.. ([this]..explaints) speakers' rejection of a sentence, he
may classify it as grammatical.. The motivation for
separating [intuitive] acceptability and grammaticality is
broadtheoretic simplicity It is simpler to generate an
infinite class including the acceptable sentences than it is
to draw a boundary around just those sentences which
rank hich in the several tests for acceptability. But in
thus choosing the simpler task we must assume that some
further theory or theories will account for those
grammatical sentences which are unacceptable. And we
must also assume that the new theory combined with a
grammatical theory will together be simpler than any
theory attempting directly to generate all and only the
acceptable sequences. In short, we are venturing that the
8 Chomsky, p.ll
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best theory to account for all the data will include a
grammar of infinite generative capacity. 9
I take Stich to be appealing to epistemic considerations in claiming that the theory
which is itself the simplest and/or can be combined with other theories to provide the
simplest account of all the data is the best theory.
Williams believes dhat there is one answer to the question of how an ethical theory
can give a compelling reason to accept a judgment which is countenanced by the
theory and conflicts with some intuitive judgments. He claims that the aims and
methods used in constructing Rawls' theory of justice exemplify an account of ethics
which provides reason to accept an ethical theory with counterintuitive consequences.
On Williams' understanding of Rawls, the account does this by making explicit its
method for resolving conflicts between intuitions and also by incorporating certain
assumptions about the people whose intuitions are being systematized by the theory,
On this understanding of Rawls, the reasons for accepting an ethical theory with
counterintuitive consequences are not the same kinds of general reasons we might
have for accepting a linguistic theory with counterintuitive consequences.
...Let us assume that there are some people who, first, are
resolved to reach agreement on important ethical
questions, and indeed are more strongly resolved to reach
agreement than they are to express different ethical
conceptions of the world. They are irreversibly
committed to living closely together in one society.
Moreover, it is agreement they are resolved to reach, and
they would not be content to end up with the mere
domination of one set of beliefs. Next, they see this as a
task that requires them to arrive at publicly stateable
principles. Last, they want this process to govern the
9 Stephen Stich, "Grammar, Psychology, and Indeterminacy", in Ned Block (ed.),
Readings in the Philosohy Psychoilogy 2 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
Press, 1981), p. 211.
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discussion of problems that will arise later from the
principles they agree upon, such as conflicts between
them In these circumstances, it is reasonable for them to
aim at an ethical theory, and it is also reasonable for them
to use a method that tries to save as many of their
intuitions as possible, while at the same time it produces a
rational structure of principles that will help make clear
what intuitions have to be dropped or modified An
obvious way to do this is to modify theory and intuitions
reciprocally until they roughly fit one another IT1 he
method is the one Rawls recommends ,of trying to arrive
at what he calls reflective equilibrium between theory
and intuition, (p 99)
Williams does not regard epistemic considerations as providing reason to accept an
ethical theory as conceived by Rawls This is made obvious in a later passage in which
Williams dismisses objections to Rawls' method for arriving at an ethical theory that
stem from concerns about whether or not the intuitions the theory does accommodate
are correct He claims that the correctness of the intuitions is irrelevant For Williams,
the important issue is whether or not the intuitions that constitute the basis of the
theory and the prior ideals that motivate the attempt to develop the theory actually are
the intuitions and the ideals of the people to whom the theory is to apply (p 102).
Thus, the one compelling reason to accept an ethical theory when it conflicts with
certain ethical beliefs is that to do so helps insure the maintenance of other basic
ethical beliefs and practices shared by people who wish to live closely together in a
society that works in a particular way expressive of these basic values
But we needn't think that this is the only compelling reason (or even a compelling
reason at all) for accepting the consequences of a particular ethical theory when some
of them are at odds with our own pre-theoretical beliefs There is a compelling reason
more in line with the kind of reason we might offer for believing a linguistic theory
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with some counter-intuitive consequences, We simply might believe that the ethical
theory is correct and the conflicting beliefs are mistaken, perhaps because the ethical
theory offers a consistent, comprehensive, detailed account of ethical judgments, the
complications of which we hadn't considered in coming to certain isolated ethical
decisions about particular cases Suppose that, for example, 10 we consider a set of
cases in which we are asked if it is right to kill one person to save several others and
another set in which we are asked if it is right to allow one person to die (when
attending to that person would prevent his death) in order to save several others The
former cases involve cutting up one healthy person and distributing organs to people
with diseases of the appropriate organ, and the latter involve apportioning doses of
medicine in which saving the life of one particular person always takes several times
as much as saving the life of any of the others. Suppose that we believe that killing the
one person in the former set of cases is never right, and letting the one person die in
the latter cases always is right. Suppose further that we firmly believe that we have
these different responses to these kinds of cases because killing is morally worse than
letting die Suppose then that we were asked to consider an ethical theory from which
it follows that killing is not morally worse than letting die. The ethical theory
maintains that it is wrong to harm others, and we are equally responsible for harm we
could prevent and harm that we directly cause. This theory may be consistent with a
wide range of our ethical judgments, significantly including our failure to distinguish
ethically between, for example, cases of poisoning the food of hospital patients which
results in death from cases in which patients are simply not fed at all, also resulting in
death. The theory does not dispute distinguishing the original sets of cases, but rather
10 This example of accepting a theory with counter-intuitive consequences comes from
arguments put forward by John Harris, in his Violence and Responsibility (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp 1-66.
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disputes that the cases should be understood as illustrating that letting die is morally
preferable to killing. This view further squares with our failure to distinguish two
other cases, which would be ethically distinguishable if the view that killing is morally
preferable to letting die were true; We are presented with a case of two people, X and Y,
dying from a snakebite. The only antidote to the snakebite is extract of human heart,
and the only spare human heart around is in the healthy body of a person A. The
taking of this extract will kill A. We judge that taking the extract and killing A in order
to save X and Y is morally wrong But taking the extract is likewise wrong in a case in
which A is not healthy and requires daily insulin injections which only we can give
him If we simply fail to give him his injections, he dies and we can use his heart to
save X and Y In this case, we simply let A die to save X and Y and yet we judge this to be
morally indistinguishable from the case in which we take the extract from a healthy A
Perhaps the more vastly counterintuitive an ethical theory is, the less likely it is that
we would feel compelled to adhere to its consequences for the reason that it provided a
consistent, comprehensive and detailed account of ethical judgments However, in the
absence of an enormous gap between pre-theoretical beliefs and theory, there could be
such a reason. Moreover, the ethical theory may incorporate or be consistent with the
findings of other theories (e,g , psychology, sociology, economics) in a way that bears
upon beliefs that conflict wain the theory and supports abandonment of these beliefs
My appeal to epistemic considerations bearing upon explanatory coherence as
support for an ethical theory presupposes that ethical theories can be true If ethical
theories could not be true, then perhaps the compelling reason Williams cites
approvingly would constitute the only reason for accepting an ethical theory.
I Lai
Williams does not believe that ethical theories can be true, but he does not argue for
this position until a later chapter. In a book which purports to be an argument for
dispensing with ethical theory which is largely aimed at convincing those who are
unsympathetic, Williams is simply helping himself to too much in making an initial
presumption that ethical theories cannot be true.
Williams' description of Rawls' account of ethical theory does suggest that there is
one genuine difference between the resolution of conflicting intuitions by appeal to
linguistic theory and the resolution of conflicting intuitions by appeal to ethical
theory. Perhaps we can use both ethical theory and linguistic theory to resolve
conflicts between intuitions in their respective domains by citing the theory as
providing the authoritative answer to an ethical or linguistic question in dispute. But
ethical theories also (unlike linguistic theories) may be in part about resolving
conflicts. Their subject matter may be the right way to resolve interpersonal conflicts,
including conflicts stemming from different ethical beliefs There is no comparable
subject matter for a linguistic theory. This could be a basis for claiming that ethical
theories are required to resolve conflicts, but linguistic theories are not. Williams may
think that the fact that ethics, but not linguistics, can have conflict resolution as a
subject matter makes a difference between the two in what can count as reasonable
grounds for accepting a theory's consequences when they conflict with our own
intuitions, When conflict resolution is a subject matter, we might understand a theory
to at least sometimes advocate dropping an ethical intuition simply for the sake of
resolving a conflict rather than, as in the case of linguistics, because we have some
reason to believe it is unreliable or incorrect. Our grounds for accepting the judgment
that the ethical intuition should be dropped could be that we may simply happen to
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believe that resolving a given conflict or resolving conflicts generally in a particular
way is more important ethically than some other ethical consideration that gets
overridden when we apply the theory that describes right conflict resolution. For
example, we may happen to believe that the promotion of cooperation and stability and
the avoidance of violence are so important ethically that, in situations in which people
hold conflicting beliefs, these values can be cited as ethical justification for doing
things that might otherwise be considered wrong (e g., tolerating the publication of
propaganda).
However, this difference does not affect the legitimacy of appealing to epistemic
considerations to support an ethical theory with consequences that contradict certain
ethical intuitions For Williams' argument to exclude epistemic considerations from the
justification, he would need to claim that it is reasonable to accept an ethical theory
about conflict resolution which may advocate doing things that you consider to be
wrong only if you accept the values (e.g., stability, cooperation, avoidance of violence)
that abiding by the theory is supposed to promote and the acceptance of these values
does not depend upon epistemic considerations. But at this point Williams offers us no
reason why epistemic considerations could not count as reasons for accepting the
values to which an ethical theory of conflict resolution appeals. Judgments about these
values and their priority over other values may simply be part of the best overall
ethical theory, where the best theory is the most comprehensive and coherent account
of ethical judgments If we accepted the values of cooperation, stability and non-
violence for this reason, epistemic considerations would play a role in our acceptance
of a theory of conflict resolution whose consequences conflicted with our ethical
intuitions.
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Conclusion
Williams' dismissal of the possibility that an ethical theory can be modelled on
linguistics is questionable, To begin with, two relatively minor points mar his account
of linguistics and so throw doubt upon his dismissal of the analogy. The question of
whether or not an internalized set of rules can explain either our linguistic judgment
or our ethical judgments is best viewed as not yet settled. Moreover, different
interpretations of what a linguistic theory is about leave open the question of whether
or not linguistic theories are simply an account of the rules internalized by speakers,
so that doubts atiput whether or not there could be any analogous rules accounting for
ethical beliefs and whether or not even if possible such an account could constitute an
ethical theory need not lead us to abandon the linguistic analogy.
More important points are that first, regardless of what a linguistic theory is about,
we needn't take a proposed analogy between ethics and linguistics to imply that an
ethical theory is a psychological theory about how people make ethical judgments, In
addition, contrary to Williams, I believe that the role that the notion of a performance
error plays for linguistic theory can have some bearing on the question of when
dismissal of an intuition conflicting with a theory is legitimate, This suggests some
possibilities for analogous dismissal of intuitions that conflict with ethical theory,
perhaps by appealing to psychological theories that have a bearing on factors
influencing our capacity to make moral judgments. Finally, the analogy does not leave
us without the possibility of having a compelling reason to adopt an ethical theory
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when it has consequences that are contrary to some of our pre-theoretical ethical
beliefs
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2. Objective Knowledge and Ethical Theory
In section 1, I argued that Williams' rejection of the linguistic analogy rests in part
upon the claim that certain epistemological considerations (e.g., explanatory
coherence) cannot provide us with a compelling reason for accepting an ethical
theory that contradicts our pre-theoretical judgments If the claim is true, ethics
should be distinguished from linguistics or any other science, since explanatory
coherence can provide us with a compelling reason to accept linguistic or other
scientific theories that contradict pre-theoretical judgments, since explanatory
coherence can be taken to be some evidence that a theory is true, According to
reflective equilibrium, which is the account of justification of ethical theories that
prompts Williams' consideration of the linguistic analogy, the coherence of an ethical
theory significantly consists, in part, of coherence with considered moral judgments
Williams clearly does not believe that the fact that an ethical theory is coherent with
considered moral judgments provides us with a reason to believe that the ethical theory
is true Two possible separate grounds for his position can be found in the text. First,
we do not have reason to believe that considered moral beliefs are true, so coherence
with those beliefs cannot be evidence of truth. Second, ethical theories fail to cohere
with other, non-moral judgments, and coherence with moral judgments is insufficient
by itself to be evidence of truth.
At one point in his discussion, Williams seems to accept the view that coherence with
considered moral judgments does not provide us with a compelling reason to believe
that an ethical theory is true, because of doubts about the truth of considered moral
judgments (p 102) The considered moral judgments with which ethical theories are
said to cohere, according to Rawls' account of reflective equilibrium, are 9imited to
those of people within certain kinds of (modern, Western) societies and so their
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reliability is open to question Because of this doubt, he believes that compelling
reasons for accepting ethical theories cannot be of the same sort as compelling
reasons for accepting linguistic theories. He concedes that coherence with considered
moral judgments may provide us with a compelling reason to accept a moral theory,
but this reason does not rest upon the claim that the theory is true. In part 2a, I argue
that since Williams himself grants that there can be pre-theoretical ethical knowledge.
he is not in a position to argue that coherence with considered moral judgments cannot
provide any reason to believe that an ethical theory is true on the grounds that we
have no reason to believe that considered moral judgments are true. In a chapter on
objectivity, he claims that we can have some ethical knowledge, and does not show that
this knowledge does not extend to the considered moral judgments that can serve as
evidence for an ethical theory
Williams also claims that ethical theories cannot meet a different epistemological
requirement that scientific theories can meet. namely, the requirement that a theory
be part of an empirical explanation of how we came to believe the theory Thus, ethical
theories fail to cohere appropriately with non-moral judgments about coming to
believe in ethical theories. This alleged failure of ethical theory might support the
claim that we do not have reason to believe that ethical theories are true, and thus
support the claim that coherence with moral judgments cannot provide us with a
reason to accept an ethical theory that contradicts our pre-theoretical judgments
However, Williams does not argue for the legitimacy of this epistemological
requirement, and his grounds for asserting that ethical theory cannot meet the
requirement are obscure In part 2b of this section, I point out some of the burdens
Williams has in making these claims in light of recent discussions of these issues
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2a, World-Guided Substantive and Non-Substantive Ethical Judgments
Williams claims that there is no good reason for maintaining that we can come to
believe ethical theories because of the way the world is, independent of our beliefs (p.
152). If there is no such reason, then there is no compelling epistemological reason to
accept an ethical theory. However, Williams does not rule out the possibility that
there can be non-theoretical, objective ethical knowledge. He grants that there can be
agreement on ethical judgments which is guided by how things are, or agreement
which is "world-guided" I believe that his concession that there is some objective
ethical knowledge can be used to argue that objective theoretical ethical knowledge is
possible, since coherence with judgments we have reason to believe are true is some
evidence of truth and ethical theories can cohere with the objective ethical knowledge
he grants Williams' discussion fails to rule out this possibility in a convincing way,
and so fails to show that we have no reason for maintaining that we can come to believe
ethical theories because of the way the world is.
Williams claims that such ethical knowledge as there is is not to be found in the
application of concepts typically found in ethical theories, for example, the concepts
"right", "good" and "best". It is rather to be found in the application of what he calls
"thick" or "substantive" concepts such as "coward", "lie", "brutality" and "gratitude"
Both Samuel Schefflerl and Warren Quinnl2 have discussed the difficulty, if not
ii Samuel Scheffler, "Morality Through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethicsand
th Li mits ofPhiosophy ", TI Philosophical Review %96 (1987) pp. 195-209.
12 Warren Quinn, "Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on
Objectivity", Philosophyv kad Public Affairs. (May 1987) pp. 195-209.
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the impossibility, of giving an account of Williams' distinction between substantive and
non-substantive ethical terms that is both consistent with his usage throughout the
book and reasonable to maintain For example, Scheffler points out that Williams
discussion seems to imply that non-substantive ethical concepts are the most general
ethical concepts, and only these ethical concepts appear in ethical theories. Given the
examples of substantive concepts that Williams offers, it is dubious that ethical theories
only make use of non-substantive concepts. Concepts that seem to have fairly specific
content, such as "consent" and "promise", regularly appear in ethical theories
Williams also claims that judgments using non-substantive concepts require a good deal
of reflection, and non-systematic ethical thought of highly traditional societies does
not include any judgments of this type. Quinn questions the claim that the notion of
"good". which Williams classifies as non-substantive, cannot appear in the judgments
of those who do not engage in systematic ethical thought and who are members of
highly traditional societies.
Whatever the difficulties in Williams' distinction, there do seem to be some features
of the sets of examples he gives of each kind of concept that we might tentatively
accept. The examples of non-substantive ,;oncepts he invokes in the course of this
argument seem at least to have a higher degree of generality than the substantive
concepts he invokes. The non-substantive concepts apply to a wider range of acts and
people than the substantive concepts apply to. For example, it may be true that most
acts of gratitude are right, but it is not true that most right acts are acts of gratitude. It
is important for Williams' argument and it seems reasonable to claim that
comprehensive ethical theories invoke ethical concepts of the higher degree of
generality, whether or not they also invoke ethical concepts of lesser generality, and
whether or not ethical concepts with the greater degree of generality also sometimes
are used when comprehensive, systematic ethical theorizing is not engaged in
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In certain situations, Williams claims that applications of ethical concepts that are
less general than "right" or "good" could count as objective ethical knowledge
Convergence on the application of such concepts could be "guided by the world"(p
141) Williams invites us to suppose that members of a society in which there is
minimal reflection on the use of substantive ethical concepts agree in cases of
application of these concepts. If the resultant agreed-upon judgments that, for
example, an act is brave can be true, the judgments will count as objective knowledge
because the judgers "have mastered these concepts and can see the personal and social
happenings to which they apply" (p 143) I take it that what Williams intends by
stipulating that the judgers have "mastered the concepts" is something beyond the
claim that the judgers apply substantive ethical terms accurately Earlier, Williams
claimed that substantive terms have "complex conditions of applications" which those
who use the terms have beliefs about (p 95) 1 venture that Williams takes ethical
knowledge to require that the judgers have some understanding of features an act or
person has in virtue of which a concept applies to the act or person The judgers must
also recognize these features of particular occurrences of acts The agreement in
application, the conceptual and perceptual abilities of the judgers, and the fact that
whether or not the judgments are made depends on the accurate perception of personal
and social happenings lead Williams to claim that these judgments are guided by the
way the world is and are worthy of candidacy for objective ethical knowledge
However, Williams claims that theoretical ethical judgments that involve the most
general ethical concepts cannot be candidates for objective ethical knowledge, or
world-guidedness He claims that their abstractness and generality preclude world-
guided application (p 152) There are several possible defenses of this claim suggested
by the test F.rst, claiming that the abstractness and generality of certain ethical
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concepts precludes their world-guided application might suggest that abstract and
general concepts do not apply in virtue of any features or properties of things in the
world. However, it seems unlikely that Williams would maintain this position, since he
claims that science can be "a systematized, theoretical description of how the world
really is (p. 135) and presumably such a systematized, theoretical description includes
abstract and general concepts. So, for Williams it seems that while it is not true that the
application of all abstract and general concepts cannot be world-guided, it is true that
the application of abstract and general ethical concepts cannot be world-guided
Perhaps the application of abstract and general ethical concepts cannot be world-
guided because abstract and general ethical concepts do not apply in virtue of any
properties or features that acts or people actually have. However, if the application of
less general, substantive ethical concepts can be world-guided, then we may have
reason to believe that the application of general ethical concepts can be. If application
of substantive ethical concepts can be world-guided, then substantive ethical concepts
apply to acts and people in virtue of features that these acts and people actually have
It is plausible to claim that a general ethical concept applies to an act just in case the
act has at least one of a set of features which is sufficient for the application of a less
general concept. For example, certain types of acts may be wrong (which I take the
liberty of classifying as a general ethical concept) if the act involves any violence
which is not needed to attain the goal for which the act is performed, which is a feature
of an act to which the concept "brutality" applies If a general ethical concept applies
just in case at least one of a disjunction of features sufficient for the application of a
substantive concept, this would seem to be some reason to believe that general ethical
concepts apply in virtue of features that acts and people have, since substantive ethical
concepts apply if acts have such features
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If a general concept applies to an act just in case the act has at least one of a set of
features sui,.cient for the application of a substantive concept, then Williams' claim
that knowledge consisting of judgments using general ethical concepts is impossible is
not supportable by the claim that general ethical concepts do not apply in virtue of
features of acts and people Perhaps we cannot be justified in believing that the
features of an act in iirtue of which a general concept applies are combinations of or
are common to features in virtue of which substantive concepts apply One argument
for this view is suggested by Williams' claim that substantive judgments that count as
objective ethical knowl itge do not have implications that are inconsistent with ethical
judgments using general concepts (p 147) Presumably. if the features in virtue of
which general concepts applied were so related to features sufficient for the
application of substantive concepts, then there would be such implications For
example, the judgment that a particular act is brutal implies that the act had the feature
of showing disregard for the well-being of those affected by it. since brutal acts are
acts that exhibit disregard for the well-being of those affected If wrong acts show
disregard for the well-being of those affected, a brutal act is a wrong act, and a
judgment that an act is brutal is inconsistent with a judgment that an act is not wrong
Williams denies that judgments using substantive concepts can have implications that
contradict judgments using general concepts because he believes that this requires
that anyone who makes a substantive judgment that is inconsistent with a non-
substantive judgment is also making a non-substantive judgment, even if the person
does not use non-substantive concepts (p 147) However, this is not required in order
to maintain that judgments involving substantive concepts can have implications that
are inconsistent with judgments using non-substantive concepts A judgment may
have implications that a person who makes the judgment does not accept So the claim
that the features in virtue of which non-substantive concepts apply are not related to
features of substantive concepts is not supported by the argument that if there are the
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implications between substantive and non-substantive judgments we might then
expect, we are committed to the dubious view that anyone who makes a substantive
judgment is also making a non-substantive judgment
Williams concedes that there is some world-guided agreement using specific ethical
concepts. He can have no quarrel with the claim that people seem to agree on at least
some ethical features of situations. The judgments on which there is agreement could
provide some reason to believe ethical judgments using more general concepts if these
judgments are justified at least in part on the basis of substantive judgments Hence
agreement on more general judgments would be world-guided at least to the extent that
their justification depended upon more specific judgments which Williams himself
concedes can be world-guided According to reflective equilibrium, the justification of
any judgment depends upon its coherence with other judgments we have reason to
believe These more general judgments are judgments that we have some reason to
believe are true, then But non-substantive judgments applying the concepts "right"
and "wrong" constitute some of the evidence for ethical theories These judgments can
be the considered moral judgments with which an ethical theory coheres, according to
reflective equilibrium Williams' own concession about substantive ethical judgments
then seems to support the claim that there can be compelling epistemological reason to
accept an ethical theory,
2b. Ethics and the Explanatory Requirement
Williams describes a distinction between scientific and ethical theory that he wishes to
defend as follows
The basic idea behind the distinction between the
scientific and the ethical, expressed in terms of
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convergence, is very simple. In a scientific inquiry there
should ideally be convergence on an answer, where the
best explanation of the convergence involves the idea
that the answer represents how things are, in the area of
the ethical, at least at a high level of generality, there is
no such coherent hope The distinction does not turn on
any difference in whether or not convergence will
actually occur, and it is important that this is not what the
argument is about It might well turn out that there will
be convergence in ethical outlook, at least among human
beings The point of the contrast is that, even if this
happens, it will not be correct to think that it has come
about because convergence has been guided by how
things actually are, whereas convergence in the sciences
might be explained in that way if it does happen (p. 136)
Williams takes the distinction to be related to traditional, though he believes somewhat
mistaken, views about distinctions between facts and values which "motivate some
version of the feeling (itself recurrent, if not exactly traditional) that science has some
chance of being more or less what it seems, a systematized theoretical account of how
the world really is, while ethical thought has no chance of being everything it seems
(p 135)
If we have good reason to suppose that agreement in science is or can be guided by
how things actually are whereas agreement in ethics cannot be, then it may seem we
have reason to doubt the possibility of arriving at justified true beliefs in ethics which
does not equally hold for science If agreement is not guided by how things actually
are, we might be tempted to suppose that it is guided by prejudice, superstitions, mere
expression of group preferences or false beliefs, all of which would disqualify what is
agreed to as a candidate for knowledge Williams does not rule out the possibility that
such problems can arise in science, but he alleges that there is a certain in principle
possibility for science but not for ethics to demonstrate that it is guided by "how things
actually are"
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...We can select among our beliefs and features of our
world picture some that we can reasonably claim to
represent the world in a way to the maximum degree
independent of our perspective and its peculiarities The
resultant picture of things, if we can carry through this
task, can be called the "absolute conception" of the world
In terms of that conception, we may hope to explain the
possibility of our attaining the conception itself, and also
the possibility of other, perspectival,
representations..The substance of the absolute
conception. lies in the idea that it could non-vacuously
explain how it itself, and the other perspectival views of
the world, are possible.lt is an important feature of
modern science that it contributes to explaining how
creatures with our origins and characteristics can
understand a world with properties that this same science
ascribes to the world (pp 138-140)
Williams suggests that at least for science the possibility of objectivity - or the
possibility of coming to agree on beliefs that represent "how things actually are" -
depends upon the possibility that what we believe could itself be part of an empirical
explanation of [Low we came to have the belief, He later claims that ethical theories are
not part of empirical explanations of our ethical beliefs (p. 150) If Williams is right,
theoretical ethical beliefs do not meet the conditions for objectivity that scientific
beliefs can meet.
Williams' view relies on controversial claims First, he claims that we are justified
in believing that a theory is true only if we have some reason to believe that it could be
a part of an empirical explanation of how we came to have belief in the theory It
seems that we have to have a positive reason to believe this (that is, some idea of what
that explanation would be, rather than simply having no reason to believe that such an
explanation could not be forthcoming), given the fact that he remarks that it is an
important feature of modern science that it contributes to such an explanation. He
offers no argument for this claim, and he owes a defense of it since it is not obvious
that there is such a requirement for the justification of theory. As Williams construes
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the requirement in terms of the "absolute conception", it is quite a feat to achieve, and
he speaks of it much more as a hope than as a reality. If this requirement is too
stringent, it will rule out theories as unjustified that we clearly count as justified, and
on these grounds may be rejected as part of an account of justification. For example,
Williams himself believes that it is difficult to see how mathematical theories are part
of the explanation of how we come to have mathematical beliefs (p. 152). Mathematical
theories could only be part of an empirical explanation of how we came to believe the
theories themselves, and so (according to the requirement), we can only be justified in
believing mathematical theories to be true, if the entities invoked in mathematical
theories were such that we could causally interact with them. To some, this may seem to
be a perfectly appropriate requirement for being justified in believing that a theory is
true, since according to a causal theory of knowledge, we can only know about things
with which we can have causal interaction Indeed, the causal theory of knowledge
and the claim that, if numbers exist, they are abstract objects with which we cannot
interact causally leads Paul Benaceraff to conclude that there are no numbers. 13 If a
less stringent requirement that would not exclude mathematical theories about
numbers as unjustified provides us with a reason to believe that theories that meet it
are true, and can rule out theories that are clearly unjustified, then we may have
reason to prefer a less stringent requirement
Examples of less stringent requirements for the justification of a theory are first,
that we are justified in believing the theory that explains spontaneous beliefs and is
not inconsistent with other justified beliefsl 4 and second, that we are justified in
believing the theory that explains beliefs we have independent reason to believe are
13 Paul Benacerraf, "What Numbers cannot Be", Philosophical Review 74 (196l%5) pp. 47-
73,
14This account of justification is advocated by William Lycan in his ludament ans
Justification. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1988), pp. 157-177; 207-213.
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true and is not inconsistent with other justified beliefs. The explanatory power of
theories counts for their justification, and the requi -.ment that theories not be
inconsistent with other justified beliefs is needed to rule out the consequence that we
are justified in believing any claim that explains a given phenomena regardless of our
other beliefs An example offered by Williams of such claims with explanatory power
that are nevertheless unjustified are claims about magical influence (p. 145), which
contradict our scientific beliefs about causality. According to the second requirement,
one kind of justified theory is a theory that is consistent with other justified beliefs and
can explain reliable observations Since mathematical theories figure in the
explanation of observations, mathematical theories can be justified on this
requirement
The second requirement might seem to be in effect no less stringent than the
requirement that a theory must be part of an empirical explanation of how we came to
believe the theory There are at least two different construals of the requirement that
the theory explain reliable observations, depending upon whether we interpret
"observations" here as observings or observeds. When construing observations as
observina•. the requirement that the theory explain reliable observations stipulates
that a theory must explain the fact that we make these observations, or that we come to
have these observational beliefs. Explaining the fact that we have certain
observational beliefs helps explain the fact that we come to believe certain theories in
attempting to account for these observational beliefs. As I discussed in Paper One, this
is how Fodor interprets the requirement that a theory must explain its evidence. On
Fodor's view, if a theory's evidence consists of observations or intuitions, it must
explain observilgs or intuitings rather than observeds or intuiteds. I argued in Paper
Two and earlier in this chapter that this interpretation may be one of the grounds for
Daniels' and Williams' rejection of the linguistic analogy. Gilbert Harman likewise
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takes the confirmation of a theory to rest in the theory's ability to explain observings -
the occurrences of the observational beliefs that constitute its evidence However, a, I
have argued earlier, the requirement that the theory explain reliable observations
need not be construed as requiring that the theory explain observings rather than
observt s On the latter construal, the theory's ability to explain just the facts gleaned
by observation, rather than the occurrences of observations, counts as evidence for
the theory In meeting either of the less stringent requirements, then, ethical theories
need only explain either the contents of moral judgments or other non-moral
judgments, be they intuiteds or observeds, rather than be a part of the explanation for
why the judgments were made
Even if we were to grant the requirement that theoretical truths must be part of an
empirical explanation of how we come to have these beliefs, Williams provides no clear
account of why theoretical ethical beliefs fail the requirement To see what burdens
such an account of justification can take on, we might consider a more lucid defense of
the claim which is offered by Harman and some criticisms of it Harman 15 claims
that moral facts do not explain the occurrence of any moral beliefs If he is right, the
truth of a moral theory could not be part of an explanation of how we came to believe
the theory, and so Williams' position would be supported Harman defends his claim by
way of examples He asks us to imagine ourselves confronted with the sight of
youngsters enjoying themselves as they pour gasoline on a cat and set it on fire We
judge that what they are doing is wrong Harman claims that no fact about the
wrongkucss of the act explains our judgment that it is wrong, since we can explain the
judgment completely in terms of the non-moral facts of the situation and psychological
15 Gilbert Harman. Th Nature of Morality. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1977)
pp 3-23
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claims about our moral beliefs We judge that the youngsters' act is wrong because we
see them inflict intense suffering for the sake of amusement and we believe that the
infliction of intense suffering for the sake of amusement is wrong Nothing about the
truth of our moral beliefs is relevant Thus, the truth of any moral theory with the
consequence that needless infliction of suffering is wrong does not enter into an
explanation of our moral judgment that that particular act is wrong, nor then should
we expect the truth of any such moral theory to enter into an explanation of our belief
in the theory
To help us see why the fact that needless suffering is wrong is irrelevant to the
explanation of our judgment that the act we witnessed is wrong. Harman invites us to
consider how different a case is in which it is clear that assuming the truth of a
judgment is relevant to explaining the judgment A scientist, seeing a vapor trail in a
cloud chamber, exclaims "There goes a proton I" Assuming that there in fact was a
proton going through a cloud chamber and causing a vapor trail is relevant to the
explanation of why the scientist who saw the vapor trail in the cloud chamber made
the judgment that there was a proton Protons are such that they behave in certain
ways that scientists who are well-versed in the ways of protons can detect their
presence So a well-trained scientist's belief in the presence of a proton can be caused,
in part, by the presence of the proton Thus we can explain the scientist s judgment by
assuming the truth of the judgment Harman claims that in this case, but not in the
ethical case, it is "reasonable to assume something about the world over and above
assumptions" about the scientist's psychology, or set of beliefs f16
16 Harman, p 17.
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Harman is not claiming that there is a difference between the scientific and the
ethical case, because, while there are scientific facts, there are no moral facts and thus
moral facts are explanatorily irrelevant Rather, his claim is that, supposing that there
are moral facts, they would be irrelevant to the nxplanation of moral judgments,
whereas scientific facts clearly are relevant to the explanation of moral judgments
David Brink17 argues that the cases Harman presents do not illustrate any differences
between ethics and science in the legitimacy of appeals to facts beyond psychology
While there is an explanation of a moral judgment which does not refer to moral facts,
but only to facts of psychology and other non-moral facts, this does not show that a
moral fact does not enter into the explanation of moral judgments The explanation of
the moral judgment without reference to the moral fact is incomplete The answer to
why we or those who taught us believe that the infliction of suffering for the sake of
pleasure is wrong surely is part of the explanation of why we believe that this
particular act is wrong If the infliction of suffering for the sake of pleasure is wrong,
this could be why we believe that it is wrong Likewise for the scientific case, facts
about the presence of a trail in a cloud chamber and beliefs about proton behavior,
rather than facts about protons. may be aA explanation for a scientist's belief that
there is a proton in a cloud chamber But a full explanation of any accurate judgment
may refer to facts about proton behavior that the scientist has come to believe
Nicholas Sturgeon l argues that there are many examples of cases in which we use
moral facts to explain moral judgments about character and behavior. Among the moral
facts are facts about character. Facts about character explain behavior from which we
infer character, thus facts about character can explain judgments about character
17 David Brink. M alRealism sad thE Foundations of lEthics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 1989) pp 185-186.
18 Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moral Explanations" in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds.,
Morality. Reason aTruth (Totowa, NJ : Rowman and Littlefield).
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For example, we believe that Hitler was morally depraved because Hitler was morally
depraved We read or hear reliable reports of Hitler's actions Those acts could only
have been performed by someone who in fact was morally depraved. We believe this,
and judge Hitler to have been morally depraved,
Sturgeon's example points to how the less stringent requirement of simply
explaining any judgments we have independent reason to believe (consistently with
other judgments) may be met by ethical theories These judgments need not be either
moral judgments or non-moral judgments about the occurrence of moral judgments
Because character explains behavior, a moral theory from which it follows that Hitler
was morally depraved helps explain non-moral judgments about Hitler's actions, which
we have independent reason to believe. This is important for two reasons First,
Harman denies with little argument that possible candidates for explanation by moral
facts can be non-moral facts other than the non-moral facts about the occurrences of
moral observations Second, if Sturgeon's example is persuasive, it supports the claim
that ethical theories can meet the less stringent requirements for justification than the
one Williams proposes If ethics can meet less stringent requirements, the claim that
there is an alternative to Williams' explanatory requirement which captures theories
that Williams' requirement cannot capture is not a criticism of his requirement which
is idle from the standpoint of defending ethical theory. In fact, Harman takes the
trouble to deny (albeit without any argument) that ethical claims could meet the less
stringent requirement because he believes that meeting that requirement could
constitute justification for believing that the moral claims are true
In defending the legitimacy of ethical theory against Williams' position, the
projected fruitfulness or ultimate ineliminability of ethical explanations need not be
argued for Williams claims the distinction between ethics and science on explanatory
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grounds as an important component of his position against ethical theorizing As such,
he has the burden of defending the explanatory requirement itself by showing that
justified theories can meet it and that less stringent requirements are inadequate. He
also owes an account of why he believes that ethical theories, in contrast to scientific
theories, cannot meet the requirement
Williams has thus not argue 4 persuasively that coherence with considered moral
judgments does not provide us with a reason to believe that an ethical theory is true
He does not show that we have no epistemological reason to accept an ethical theory
that contradicts pre-theoretical judgments and that thus the linguistic analogy fails to
suggest any reason to accept an ethical theory that contradicts pre-theoretical
judgments
Williams' rejection of the linguistic analogy suffers from at least two separate
shortcomings First, some of his arguments are based upon a construal of the
implications of a linguistic model which we need not accept, given that we have a
plausible alternative The subject matter of linguistic theorizing need not be construed
as the internalized set of linguistic rules rather than the abstract structures of natural
languages Second, as I have discussed in this section, his remaining argument must be
buttressed by a demonstration that ethical theories do not meet acceptable
epistemological standards Williams does not provide that demonstration and we have
some reason to be sceptical of the claim
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